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From Here to Beijing: Public/Private Overlaps in
Trade and Their Effects on U.S. Law
By: Elizabeth Trujillo*

INTRODUCTION

Despite China's recent achievements at the Beijing Olympics, 1 news
involving contaminated pet food and unsafe toys imported from China
makes us question the legal frameworks that facilitated such incidents
and stirs anti-globalization sentiment.2 While consumers wonder about
the role their governments play in this context and look for remedies
that respond in some meaningful way to the forces of globalization,
deeper questions lie underneath the surface of the legal remedial work
of domestic courts. International trade and globalization have provided
greater access to imported goods for consumers and more opportunities
for corporations to export their products. However, amid this increasing
exchange of goods, the regulatory power of states and the jurisdictional
reach of domestic courts are constrained. International regimes such as

* Associate Professor, Suffolk University Law School. This paper was presented at the
following conferences and faculty workshops: Suffolk University Law School, January 2009;
Law and Society Annual Meeting in May 2008, Montreal, Quebec, Canada as part of a panel on
the effects of transnational legal processes and international trade on domestic regulatory policy;
University of Connecticut School of Law Faculty Workshop Series, University of Connecticut
School of Law, Hartford, Connecticut, April 2008; and Junior International Law Scholars Annual
Conference, New York Law School, New York, New York, February, 2008. Many thanks to all
those participants who have contributed greatly to the development of this piece. Special thanks
to Hannah Buxbaum, David Gantz, Joseph Franco, Alasdair Roberts, Jessica Silbey, and Joel P.
Trachtman for comments on earlier drafts. My gratitude as well for the wonderful research
assistance of Aykut Ozger, Nicole Hostettler, and Merissa Farmer as well as my colleagues at
Suffolk University Law School for their support and comments on this Article.
1. See generally Nicholas D. Kristof, China's Rise Goes Beyond Gold Metals, N.Y. TIMES,

Aug. 21, 2008, at A23 (discussing China's success at Olympics and growing economy).
2. See Senate Homeland Security Committee Begins Investigation of Toy Import Safety, 24
INT'L TRADE REP. 1243 (2007); Ed Taylor, Trade Policy Brazil Bans Imports of Mattel Toys on
Heels of Recall, Lead Paint Issues, 24 INT'L TRADE REP. 1325 (2007); Kathleen E. McLaughlin,
Standards: EU Urges Quality, Safety Assurancesfor Chinese Food, Consumer Exports, 24 INT'L
TRADE REP. 1072 (2007); see also Audra Ang, China Defends Quality of its Exported Goods,
Problems Attributed to Differing Standards, U.S. Product Designs, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Aug.
28, 2007, at C4.
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the World Trade Organization (WTO), through its Member States,
encourage the growth of private interests and the expansion of trade,
contributing to changing legal and regulatory landscapes. As a result, a
collage of trade and private investment regimes has emerged regionally
and bilaterally. At times, these regimes, through their various dispute
resolution bodies, seem to work in tandem. Other times, though, they
collide and conflict with one another on substantive issues relating to
trade, private investment, and domestic policy.
This article maps the legal paradigms in place under international
trade law and demonstrates the way in which trade issues overlap with
the interests of private investors. When WTO panels, in dealing with
regulatory measures under national treatment provisions of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), fail to identify the horizontal
and vertical overlaps that exist among trade and investment causes of
action, particularly in the context of traditionally state regulated
industries, governments (through forum shopping to the WTO) can
indirectly assist foreign investors in their private rights of actions
against a host government. Furthermore, overlapping disputes in
multiple fora can place unnecessary financial burdens on developing
nations. A "bottom-up coordination," that is, from regional tribunals to
WTO panels, without the necessary "top-down coordination" by the
WTO to regional tribunals can strengthen the power of special interests
in influencing and manipulating the WTO system 3 and hurt developing
countries by encouraging forum-shopping. 4 By "unpacking" the
overlaps between trade and investment causes of action, this paper
illustrates that the same non-state actors are bringing similar investment

3. See, e.g., Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 311
(2002) (distinguishing between "bottom-up norm creation" and the traditional "top-down"
approach to international law where international institutions can influence norms that are
implemented by nation-states); See also, Janet Koven Levit, A Bottom-Up Approach to
InternationalLawmaking: The Tale of Three Trade FinanceInstruments, 30 YALE J. INT'L L. 125
(2005) (using bottom up lawmaking to describe the trade practices that emerge from transnational
financial actors and eventually become "hard law" by nation-states). See also, GREG SHAFFER,
DEFENDING INTERESTS: PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN WTO LITIGATION 1-18 (Brookings
Institution Press 2003) (describing the relationship between "public-private networks" and
international governance, specifically through the "blurring" of the public and private divide in
WTO trade litigation).
4. See Joost Pauwelyn, ICTSAD/GIAN-RUIG, Speaker notes for dialogue on the Mexico Soft
Drinks Dispute: Implications for Regionalism and for Trade and Sustainable Development:
"Choice of Jurisdiction" WTO and Regional Dispute Settlement Mechanisms: Challenges,
Options and Opportunities, at 1.2. (stating that overlapping dispute processes, in terms of differing
fora, gives complainants the opportunity to forum shop and thereby place a financial burden on
developing countries).
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disputes before regional tribunals such as NAFTA and at the same time,
lobbying their governments for the trade adjudication before the WTO.
By ignoring these overlaps, WTO adjudication becomes fraught with
inconsistency and a perceived bias which effectively alienates its
members from the multilateral trade system. This is especially relevant
in the context of domestic regulation, where national treatment
provisions under the GATT limit the extent to which a member state
may enforce domestic regulations, even those dealing with safety or
health standards.
Hearing of lead contaminated toys may make some shake their fists
at the WTO and others in the federal government for not doing more to
prevent this, and yet others may shake their fists at the Chinese for their
perceived negligence. Though most trade agreements incorporate
provisions allowing for domestic governments to pass legitimate
regulations regarding health and safety, national and state governments
still run the risk of being perceived as protectionist if they pass
regulations that do not fall within those strict parameters. 5 Domestic
courts may be able to resolve some of the state consumer protection
issues, but cannot necessarily reach the foreign manufacturer in any
meaningful way to find solutions. 6 Finally, the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GAT) and various other trade agreements cannot
properly address these issues either. National treatment provisions
within the GATT or the North American Trade Agreement (NAFTA),
for example, limit the power of domestic regulation by ensuring that
foreign products that are "like" domestic products be treated in a nondiscriminatory manner. 7 It can be difficult for states to meet this non-

5. See, e.g., Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, Technical Barriers to the Trade Agreement, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement,
Annex IA [hereinafter TBT Agreement]; Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Agreement, Apr.
15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex IA [hereinafter SPS Agreement]; see also North American
Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M 289 (1993) [hereinafter
NAFTA] (comparing the agreements as chapters in the NAFTA under chapters 9 (TBT) & 7
(SPS)).
6. See In re Thomas Trains Paint Litig., No. 07 C 3514, 2007 WL 2667851 (N.D. Il. Aug. 28,
2007). The case involved plaintiffs bringing a class action on behalf of all consumers who
purchased Thomas & Friends Wooden Railway vehicles containing lead paint and imported
and/or distributed between January 2005 and June 2007 against defendants, including
manufacturer and distributors such as RC2 Corp., Learning Curve Brands, Inc. and Apax
Partners, Inc. Id. RC 2's Thomas Toys are manufactured in China where RC2 has a longstanding
investment. Id. In 1997, RC2 developed the RC2 Industrial Zone in Dongguan, China where
some suppliers also operate facilities. Id.
7. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Art. Im, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A- 11, 55
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GAT; NAFTA, supra note 5, art. 301 (incorporating the national
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Furthermore, regional dispute settlement
discriminatory standard.
bodies tend to look to WTO adjudication of domestic regulatory
measures, and this may exacerbate the problem and make it more
difficult for states to pass even legitimate regulatory measures to
address these issues. This "deferential" approach by regional tribunals
results in a "bottom-up coordination" that contributes to the increasing
legitimacy of WTO jurisprudence, particularly with regard to national
treatment issues. 8 However, unless this "bottom-up coordination" is
complemented with "top-down coordination" by the WTO panels, only
will continue to be
private interests, through the assistance of states,
9
governance.
domestic
of
served at the expense
In illustrating where the trade and investment regimes intersect, this
Article will look at WTO and NAFTA adjudication of similar issues
such as national treatment. 10 Such overlaps do not necessarily imply
that WTO decisions regarding national treatment will automatically be
adopted by a regional tribunal dealing with a national treatment issue.
Nor do these overlaps mean that a private investment tribunal will
necessarily adopt a WTO panel decision as controlling law for its own
decisions. However, unpacking these overlaps does illustrate the way in
which claimants bringing cases before a regional tribunal use the WTO
to give weight to their arguments and thereby to the regional tribunal

treatment provision of GATT Article III).
8. "Deference" as used in this Article does not mean that regional tribunals necessarily agree
with and adopt WTO decisions adjudicating similar issues coming up before the regional tribunal
at hand. Instead, it refers to the tendency of regional tribunals to look to WTO adjudication and
interpretation of similar terminology found in the GATT as found in a regional agreement (i.e.
national treatment) in making their own decisions on similar issues.
9. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
10. See Elizabeth Trujillo, Mission Possible: Reciprocal Deference Between Domestic
Regulatory Structures and the WTO, 40 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 201, 207 (2007) (comparing the

NAFTA Chapter 11 adjudication of national treatment with the WTO adjudication under GATT
Article IMIand concluding that the Chapter II tribunals tend to give deference to the regulatory
context of the measure in question as well as to WTO adjudication of "like products" under
GATT Article III); see also Nicholas DiMascio & Joost Pauwelyn, Nondiscriminationin Trade
and Investment Treaties: Worlds Apart or Two Sides of the Same Coin?, 102 AM. J. INT'L L. 48,

81 (2008) (comparing WTO and NAFTA Chapter 11 adjudication of national treatment and
stating that NAIFTA investment regimes have a stronger concern for public policy justifications of
discrimination, which the authors term "regulatory context test," rather than under the WTO
adjudication of Article III which uses primarily a "competition test"); see generally Joel P.
Trachtman, FDI and the Right to Regulate: Lessons from Trade Law, in U.N. CONFERENCE ON
TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, THE DEVELOPMENT DIMENSIONS OF FDI: POLICY AND RULEMAKING PERSPECTIVES 189, U.N. Doc. UNCTADJITE/IIA/2003/4 (2003), available at

http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteiia20034_en.pdf (describing the similarities and differences
between investment and trade regimes and noting that the political economy of investment is
different from trade).
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decision, and in turn, enhance the legitimacy of the award. 11 In
attempting to unpack these overlaps, this Article identifies the
transnational nature of international trade. It will also discuss ways in
which the WTO may increase coordination among a plurality of legal
regimes that span the domestic and international landscapes.
Specifically, it will opine that a procedural mechanism called reciprocal
deference can help enhance coordination among the various trade
regimes. 12 Reciprocal deference is an approach that recognizes the
transnational nature of trade and the state and non-state actors working
within and around its processes. 13 The current paradigm of trade
regimes that lacks coordination allows problems traditionally managed
by public entities within a state to fall through the cracks between the
international and domestic regulatory and legal frameworks. Reciprocal
deference will allow for the pluralist landscape of trade to persist while
14
helping to "manage hybridity" of adjudicatory fora.
Part I of this article illustrates the multi-scalar nature of domestic
governance and international trade regimes, multilaterally and
regionally or bilaterally.15 Specifically, it will distinguish between two
international adjudicatory regimes: 1) the private investment regime
framed within regional trade agreements such as NAFTA and other

11. The tendency of regional tribunals to "defer" to WTO adjudication in national treatment
cases arises from the fact that attorneys for the claimants defer to WTO adjudication in bringing
forth their arguments before the regional tribunals. See Trujillo, supra note 10, at 206.
12. Reciprocal deference was a concept developed in Mission Possible. See generally
Trujillo, supra note 10. Drawing from NAFTA chapter 11 adjudication of regulatory measures
and U.S. dormant commerce clause jurisprudence, this procedural mechanism allows for
enhanced transparency and clarification for WTO panels of domestic regulatory measures that are
legitimate under the GAT'. Id. at 235. It calls for some deference by WTO panels to domestic
regulatory processes and sets guidelines by which measures arising from such processes may be
assessed for legitimacy. Id. at 236.
13. See, e.g., S.G. Sreejith, Public International Law and the WTO: A Reckoning of Legal
Positivism and Neoliberalism, 9 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 5, 54 (2007); see generally ROBERT 0.
KEOHANE & JOSEPH S. NYE, POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE: WORLD POLITICS IN TRANSITION
(1977); Robert 0. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Transgovernmental Relations and International
Organizations,in WORLD POLITICS 40 (1974).
14. See Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155, 1155, 1197
(2007) (describing a new global world of hybrid legal spaces where "normative conflict among
multiple, overlapping legal systems is unavoidable"). Rather than avoiding these eventual
conflicts, Professor Berman offers legal pluralism as a means for managing, rather than
eliminating, such hybridity. Id. at 1197.
15. See Hari M. Osofsky, The Geography of Climate Change Litigation: Implications for
Transnational Regulatory Governance, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1789, 1814 (2005) [hereinafter
Osofsky, Geography of Climate Change Litigation] (describing multiscalar); see also Har M.
Osofsky, Climate Change Litigation as Pluralist Legal Dialogue?, 43A STANFORD J. INT'L L.
181, 187 (2007) [hereinafter Osofsky, Pluralist Legal Dialogue] (discussing what a model of
multiscalar global legal pluralism could look like).
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similar regional trade agreements, and 2) the trade regime, located
within the multilateral framework of the WTO as well as in regional and
bilateral trade agreements. Though seemingly different, particularly in
the remedies they provide participating parties, the public/private
overlap that these two adjudicatory regimes engender 16share common
interests, legal spaces, and impact domestic governance.
Part II describes the way in which the investment and trade regimes
overlap. Borrowing from Professor Alan Sykes' distinction of "private

rights of action" for foreign investors and "public rights of action" for
governments bringing trade disputes, this Section will refer to "public"
actions as those formally brought to the WTO or a regional tribunal by a
state. 17 However, this Section will not specifically discuss the private
actors that influence governments to bring such trade disputes in the
first place. 18
It focuses primarily on the overlaps among the
adjudicatory processes of the two regimes; however, it also looks at the

way in which the regional trade regimes can intersect with the
multilateral trade regime of the WTO on substantive trade law.
Specifically, this Section will discuss NAFTA disputes as compared
to similar disputes at the multilateral level. One case in particular
illustrates this phenomenon. The Chapter 11 investor-state dispute,
Corn Products International v. United Mexican States,19 began as a
trade dispute between the United States and Mexico for alleged
dumping of high fructose corn syrup by the United States into
Mexico. 20 Shortly after the U.S. investor brought the Corn Products
16. See Alan Sykes, Public v. Private Enforcement of International Economic Law: Of

Standing and Remedy 7-8 (Univ. of Chi. John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 235,
2005), available at http://ssrn.comlabstractid=671801 (describing investment disputes as
resulting in monetary damages for private actors whereas WTO trade disputes provide retaliatory
measures as remedies for governments); see generally ALFRED C. AMAN, JR., THE DEMOCRACY
DEFICIT: TAMING GLOBALIZATION THROUGH LAW REFORM (2004) (discussing the changing
relationship between the state and international institutions in the face of globalization).
17. See Sykes, supra note 16, at 2. These two types of actions have different enforcement
mechanisms: private rights of action having monetary damages (by governments to private
investors) in contrast with public rights of actions where there is no direct remedy of enforcement
except through retaliation. Id.
18.

See, e.g., SHAFFER, supra note 3, at 6 (describing the private-public agreements

influencing the WTO litigation); see also Joel P. Trachtman & Philip M. Moremen, Costs and
Benefits of Private Participationin WTO Dispute Settlement: Whose Right Is it Anyway?, 44

HARv. INT'L L.J. 221, 230 (2003) (discussing the various normative implications of private
participation in WTO litigation). Private in this piece refers to the private persons ranging from
individuals, corporations, to non-governmental organizations suing to "protect a perceived public
interest." Id. at 221.
19. Request for Institution of Arbitration Proceedings, Corn Prod. Int'l v. United Mexican
States, Oct. 21, 2003 [hereinafter Corn Products International].

20. The antidumping dispute was decided by the WTO in Panel Report, Mexico-Anti-
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International claim under NAFIA, the United States filed a trade
dispute with the WTO, Mexico-Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other
Beverages, alleging national treatment violations under GATT by
Mexico as a result of a tax passed on soda bottlers using high fructose
corn syrup. Whereas the WTO found Mexico in violation of GATT, the
NAFTA Chapter 11 tribunal is in the final stages of issuing its
decision. 2 1 It is unclear whether the NAFTA tribunal will be influenced
by the WTO decision; however, Chapter 11 tribunals have been known
to defer in the past to WTO interpretations of national treatment. 22 This
Part will illustrate the importance of unpacking such substantive
overlaps so as to 1) diminish the tendency of nations to forum-shop to
the WTO in order to gain a strategic advantage in trade and investment
disputes, and 2) check the influence of private groups and industrialized
23
nations on the WTO system.
Part III will consider various perspectives on the role of the WTO in
the context of trade and domestic regulatory processes.
More
specifically, it addresses some of the limitations presented by some of
these approaches. 24 For example, if the WTO follows a regulatory
model for domestic administrative processes, it would in fact direct
Member States to harmonize their domestic laws in accordance with
global standards and processes. 25 However, this model does not take

Dumping Investigation of High Fructose Corn Syrup from the United States, WT/DS132/R (Jan.
28, 2000) (adopted Feb. 25, 2000) and a NAFTA Chapter 19 Tribunal in Review of the Final
Determination of the Antidumping Investigation on Imports of High Fructose Corn Syrup,
Originating from the United States of America, Mex.-U.S.-98-1904-01 (Aug. 3, 2001)[hereinafter
Imports of High Fructose Corn Syrup].
21. The Chapter II case, Corn Products International,has been decided but not yet published.
One source has stated that the decision has come out in favor of the U.S. investor, Corn Products
International and that a hearing on damages should be held in August 2008. See News Release,
Corn Products International Updates NAFTA Proceedings, Corn Products International, Inc.
(Dec. 19, 2007), http://ir.cornproducts.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=77278&p=irol-newsArticle&ID
=1088855&highlight.
22. See Trujillo, supra note 10, at 239 (discussing the tendency of Chapter II NAFTA
tribunals to defer to WTO interpretation of "like products" regarding national treatment
violations).
23. See Pauwelyn, supra note 4, at 1.2 (stating that overlapping dispute processes, in terms of
differing fora, gives complainants the opportunity to forum shop and thereby place a financial
burden on developing countries).
24. See, e.g., Hannah L. Buxbaum, Transnational Regulatory Litigation, 46 VA. J. INT'L L.
251, 305 (2006) (discussing the jurisdictional tension arising from the tendency of national courts
to implement global regulatory strategies and international law norms and proposing a functional
approach in the economic context).
25. See John 0. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, Commentary: The World Trade
Constitution, 114 HARV. L. REV. 511, 517-19 (2000) (finding weaknesses in the regulatory
model and comparing it to the anti-discrimination model which defers more to national
governments); see also Trujillo, supra note 10, at 232.
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into account the transnational nature of trade itself. 26 Public and private
networks working across borders, sometimes in tandem, help to increase
27
trade on the ground and shape the laws surrounding its proliferation.
Moreover, the inter-systemic nature of the trade regimes gives rise to a
larger, complex network that is hybrid in nature, 2 8 but requires
coordination. The tendency of regional tribunals to defer to WTO
interpretations of trade commitments creates a "bottom-up"
coordination that can benefit private actors at the expense of possible
legitimate domestic regulatory policy. In doing so, private actors are
not only presuming the legitimacy of WTO jurisprudence for strategic
purposes, they are also solidifying the WTO as a legitimate adjudicator
and creator of international norms through their dispute resolution
bodies. Because trade relationships have dimensional complexity, it
becomes inherently problematic for WTO panels, in order to achieve
consistent and principled adjudicated outcomes in trade disputes, to not
unpack policies underlying overlapping trade agreements. Therefore,
WTO panels should make a conscious effort to unpack private/public
overlaps in order to create "top down coordination" with regional
tribunals.
A top-down coordination in concert with bottom-up
coordination allows the WTO to play an active role in setting
international trade norms that take into account the multi-layered
aspects of international and domestic adjudicatory processes
surrounding domestic regulation. This would be more aligned, for
example, with the reality that international institutions, such as the
WTO, rely on domestic governments to enforce their decisions.
Implementing procedural mechanisms, such as reciprocaldeference, is
one way to encourage this "top down coordination" and unpack these
private/public overlaps, enhancing adjudicatory balance within the trade
regimes. 29 Furthermore, a procedural mechanism of this kind will not
26. See generally KEOHANE & NYE, supra note 13.
27. Professor Anne-Marie Slaughter, in describing horizontal and vertical relationships in the
context of transnational judicial interaction and the emergence of global constitutional
jurisprudence, describes a global legal system comprised of "horizontal and vertical networks" at
the national and international level, that share a common space arising "from jurisdiction over a
common area of law or a particular region of the world." ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW
WORLD ORDER 67 (2004). She describes these networks as moving across border lines,
comprised of judges, legislators, governments, intergovernmental and nongovernmental
organizations, private corporations, and the like. Id.
28. See, e.g., Keith Aoki & Kennedy Luvai, Reclaiming "Common Heritage" Treatment in
the International Plant Genetic Resources Regime Complex, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 35, 44
(2007) (describing the international overlapping regimes in the context of intellectual property
regimes pertaining to legal protections of plant genetic resources).
29. Reciprocal deference allows WTO panels to unpack the overlaps among trade regimes and
it provides a procedural mechanism through which deference to domestic regulatory processes is
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eradicate the hybrid nature of trade regimes; rather, it will embrace legal

plurality in this context while 30
managing it through a dialogical approach

spurred on by the WTO itself.
Finally, Part IV will discuss the landscape of current overlapping
trade regimes and their non-static nature through a pluralist lens.31 This
Part will attempt to illustrate how inter-regime shifts cause the private
and public trade regimes to not be entirely distinct. Rather, they are
porous, fluid, and mobile, whereby related issues seep into the private
realm of investment as well as into the public realm of trade. This
mobility is another means of allowing non-state actors, primarily private
investors and industries, to influence domestic governments into
bringing trade disputes to the WTO.32 Additionally, Part IV will
discuss bottom-up coordination and demonstrate how regime shifting
illustrates the need for top-down coordination from the WTO. It also
can encourage dialogue and have positive effects on developing
countries. Legal pluralism and regime shifting allow for a dialogical
approach to dealing with trade and regulatory matters by facilitating the
33
creation of new intemational standards and norms.
This Article concludes by depicting the nonstatic nature of
international regimes and proposes that reciprocal deference is more
aligned with this view. It illustrates the ways in which globalization has
made room for various legal spaces to emerge and at times, overlap and
even collide. 34 The challenge is to "manage hybridrity" of trade
35
regimes, without necessarily eliminating the hybridity itself.
key in understanding the degree of legitimacy in regulatory measures and in increasing
transparency at the domestic level. For a detailed discussion of reciprocaldeference as a possible
procedural mechanism for WTO panels dealing with domestic regulatory measures, see generally
Trujillo, supra note 10.
30. See Berman, supra note 3, at 484 (discussing cultural hybridization); see also Andrea K.
Bjorklund, Private Rights and Public InternationalLaw: Why Competition Among International
Economic Law Tribunals Is Not Working, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 241, 244 (2007) (stating that
"[a]chieving more coordination, and even harmonization, among tribunals will require moving
beyond the historic distinction between states and individuals in international law").
31. See generally Laurence R. Heifer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPS Agreement and New
Dynamics of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (2004)
(assessing challenges to TRIPS and the expansion of intellectual property law).
32. See generally SHAFFER, supra note 3.
33. See Helfer, supra note 31, at 14 (describing that counterregime norms are "binding treaty
rules and nonbinding soft law standards that seek to alter the prevailing legal landscape").
34. See Berman, supra note 14, at 1196 (describing international law through a pluralist lens).
See also Elizabeth Trujillo, Shifting Paradigmsof Parochialism:Lessons for InternationalTrade
Law, 3 J. INT'L L. & INT'L REL. 41, 42 (2007) (University of Toronto Faculty of Law and Munk
Centre for International Studies, Peer Review) (discussing parochial interests as they pertain to
international trade).
35. See Berman, supra note 14, at 1196 (describing a new global world of hybrid legal spaces
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Reciprocal deference is one way WTO panels may manage hybridity
and increase flexibility and normative change on issues of international
trade and international law, while remaining a "neutral" international
institution that adjudicates trade matters more centrally. 36 Through
procedural mechanisms like reciprocal deference, WTO panels can
increase top down coordination by 1) unpacking substantive and
jurisdictional overlaps, 2) deferring to regional tribunals for matters that
are more appropriately managed at the regional level, and 3)
encouraging dialogue among state and non-state actors regarding trade
matters.
If the WTO panels remain passive on regional and bilateral issues, it
could lose its cohesive force in maintaining the multilateral trade
system. The recent failure of the Doha Round 3 7 indicates the current
weakness within the multilateral system that includes not only
traditional economic powers such as the U.S. and Europe, but also
emerging economies such as India, Brazil, and China. The failure of the
Doha Round not only has economic ramifications for free trade, but
38
more importantly, it has symbolic and political consequences globally.
Key to maintaining a cohesive globalized trade system is finding ways
of coordinating the multilateral trade regime with the regional and
bilateral regimes. Such a trade system not only facilitates the exchange
of goods and services among nations but it also can help shape domestic
regulation. In this view of trade, it is not so surprising that defective
products from China, for example, could affect consumers in the United
States. The challenge for governments and private actors, though, is to
address these issues while navigating through a complex trade system,
without losing compliance with international commitments.
I. THE MULTILATERAL/REGIONAL DISCONNECT
A. The Good, the Bad, and the Multi-Scalar
Two layers of adjudicatory processes can be easily distinguished as
taking place in the context of regulatory measures: 1) the processes that

where "normative conflict among multiple, overlapping legal systems is unavoidable."). Rather
than avoiding these eventual conflicts, Professor Berman offers legal pluralism as a means for
managing, rather than eliminating, such hybridity.
36. See Trujillo, supra note 10, at 203 (proposing a reciprocal deference approach with which
the WTO could handle regulatory measures).
37. Anup Shah, WTO Doha "Development" Trade Round Collapse, GLOBAL ISSUES, July 28,
2006, http://www.globalissues.org/article/663/wto-doha-development-trade-round-collapse-2006.
38. See Beyond Doha, EcONOMIST, Oct. 9, 2008, at 31 (describing the Doha impasse as a
reflection of intellectual shifts in international perspectives).
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occur at the domestic level among administrative bodies and state and
federal courts, and 2) the supranational adjudication that occurs on
WTO panels and regional tribunals. These layers are far from twodimensional, for they intersect with other external and internal factors
and shift in their relative judicial impact. At the domestic level, for
example, it can be unclear whether environmental or health measures
fall under the aegis of state law or federal law.
In the area of environmental law, some states have asserted their
power. For example, California has passed regulations prohibiting the
use of methanol for reformulated gasoline, as well as other
environmental regulations, in hopes of being in line with the Kyoto
Protocol even though the federal government has refused to sign onto
it. 39
But also in this context, states have backed away from
overstepping their state authority and on the other hand, have tried to
push the federal government to assert its jurisdiction to pass regulations
dealing with fuel emissions causing global warming. Massachusetts v.
EPA40 is one example of this phenomenon. In this case, the state of
Massachusetts, along with other local authorities and private
organizations, brought a claim against the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) for its refusal to begin regulating the emissions of
polluting gases. The EPA responded by arguing that the Clean Air Act
does not mandate that the EPA regulate such emissions and that any
such regulation would conflict with actions being taken by the President
and his cabinet. 41 The U.S. Supreme Court agreed with the petitioners
and found that the EPA did have jurisdiction to regulate gas emissions
under the Clean Air Act. However, the Court resisted deciding whether
the EPA had a duty to do so. 42 Most recently, President Obama directed

39. See, e.g., CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 13, § 2449 (2008) (regarding fuel emission standards); AB
218 Bill (Saldafia) (phasing out the use of certain hazardous materials found in consumer
electronics and being consistent with the European Union's ROHs Directive); California Global
Warming Solutions Act of 2006 (AB 32), CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 38500 et seq. (West
2008) (reducing greenhouse emissions by 25% by 2020 and 80% by 2050); see also Conference
of the Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate Change: Kyoto Protocol to the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 (2007); see
generally International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives, Cities for Climate Protection,
http://www.iclei.org/co2/index.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2009) (indicating a number of U.S. cities
and nations participating in this environmental initiative).
40. Massachusetts v. EPA, 548 U.S. 903 (2006).
41. See id. at 903. The EPA also claimed that there was no sufficient causal link between
greenhouse gases and global warming and therefore it would be "unwise" to set emission
standards at this time. Id.
42. See id. The Court also stated that its review on the statutory issues was narrow and that
the EPA had the authority to conclude, after review of the petition, that it could not regulate such
emissions but must do so giving reasonable grounds for its decision. Id.
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the EPA to begin working on applications from California and other
states to set stricter standards for car fuel emissions than currently
required by national regulations. 43 These various scenarios in dealing
with fuel emissions illustrate the multiplicity of public and non-state
actors that deal with the multi-scalar nature44 of environmental regulation
in the U.S. at the national and local levels.
Recently proposed Massachusetts legislation prohibiting the sale of
foods containing trans fats by restaurants and grocery stores raises
questions as to whether, in the interest of health standards, a state can
pass legislation that could potentially have important discriminatory
effects on interstate commerce and therefore implicate dormant
commerce clause jurisprudence. 45 An even larger question is whether
such legislation could have discriminatory affects on foreign imports
containing trans fats. While trade agreements under the WTO or
NAFTA, for example, contain provisions allowing domestic
governments to pass legitimate safety and health measures,
distinguishing between legitimate measures and illegitimate ones proves
to be difficult for international tribunals. It is in the application of these
46
measures where discriminatory effects can be most readily assessed.
Nevertheless, in issues such as these that are seemingly "purely
domestic" in nature, the jurisdiction of the WTO and/or a regional
agreement may come into play.
Finally, recent news about the hazards of Chinese toys comes to
mind. If the United States were to pass regulations making it more
difficult to import such products as a health measure, it could have
implications for U.S. compliance with WTO/GATT national treatment
requirements and a bilateral United States/Chinese treaty protecting
43.

See John M. Broder, Obama Directs Regulators to Tighten Auto Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.

27,
2009,
http://www.nytimes.com12009/01/27/us/politics/27calif.html?_r=l &partner=rss.
President Obama also ordered the Department of Transportation to formulate rules for higher
fuel-economy standards on cars and trucks. Id. See also Judith Lewis, Op-Ed, California's EPA
Waiver, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2009, at A19 (discussing various state initiatives by California and

other states to pass regulations to reduce emissions of greenhouse gasses).
44. See Osofsky, Pluralist Legal Dialogue, supra note 15; see generally Hari M. Osofsy &
Janet Koven Levit, The Scale of Networks? Local Climate Change Coalitions, 8 CHI. J. INT'L L.

409 (2008) (discussing local efforts in Portland and Tulsa for addressing environmental
concerns).
45. See H.B. 2147, 185th Gen. Court (Mass. 2007) (restricting the use of foods containing
trans- fat).
46. See, e.g., SPS Agreement, supra note 5, including annexes; Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA, Multilateral Agreements on Trade in
Goods [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement]; TBT Agreement, supra note 5, including annexes;
NAFrA, supra note 5, ch. 9 (discussing Standard Related Measures) and ch. 7 (discussing

Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures).

2009]

Public/Private Overlaps in Trade

mutual most favored nation treatment. 47 Though, WTO agreements
such as the SPS 48 and the TBT 49 Agreements do allow for domestic
governments to pass legitimate measures addressing safety and health
measures, trade provisions dealing with sanitary or phytosanitary
measures tend to require scientific evidence justifying the regulatory
measure, and those dealing with technical barriers also require at a

minimum evidence of a legitimate objective. 50 These provisions, while
helpful in allowing domestic governments to pass necessary regulations,

also do not clarify the degree to which such regulation is in fact
legitimate, particularly when there is no clear scientific evidence of
potential harm concerning a product. 5 1 There does not seem to be clear

consensus on the best way to apply the precautionary principle in these
circumstances either. 52 At a minimum, though, these trade provisions
do encourage harmonization of regulatory standards and the creation of
international standards regarding product safety. 53 In this way, local

governance54 can be influenced by the supranational adjudicatory
processes.

However, this Article's focus is not on these overlaps that occur at
the domestic level or have transnational implications. Rather, it is on
the international trading landscape consisting of inter-systemic overlaps
among trade regimes as well as the trade communities made up of
This collage impacts not only the
public and private actors.

47. See, e.g., James Bacchus, WTO Obligations Still Apply, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 10, 2007.
48. SPS Agreement, supra note 5 (directing governments as to how they can apply food safety
and animal and plant health measures).
49. TBT Agreement, supra note 5 (mandating efforts that regulations, standards, testing and
certification procedures do not create unnecessary obstacles for trade).
50. See, e.g., SPS Agreement, supra note 5, including annexes; Marrakesh Agreement, supra
note 46; TBT Agreement, supra note 5, including annexes; NAFTA, supra note 3, ch. 9
(discussing Standard Related Measures) and ch. 7 (discussing Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures).
5I. See, e.g., NAFTA, supra note 5, ch. 9, art. 904.
52. See id. ch. 7, art. 715(4) (recognizing the precautionary principle which allows parties to
adopt provisional measures where scientific evidence is insufficient as long as those measures are
not arbitrary).
53. See id. ch. 7, art. 713 (presuming that measures in conformance with international
standards are in fact legitimate); id. ch. 9, art. 905. Both Chapters 7 & 9 in NAFrA also establish
a committee to coordinate harmonization initiatives among the Parties.
54. See David J. Barron & Gerald E. Frug, Defensive Localism: A View of the Field from the
Field, 21 J.L. & POL. 261, 264 (2005) (discussing limited powers of local governments); see
generally David J. Barron & Gerald E. Frug, International Local Government Law, 38 URB.
LAW. 1, 3 (2006) [hereinafter Barron & Frug, InternationalLocal Government Law] (describing
ways in which local governments use international institutions and international law to redefine
their domestic legal scope).
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international trading system but also domestic regulatory processes
nationally and locally.
As there may be "good and bad" in the jurisdictional and legislative
tensions existing between local and federal governments, similarly,
regional trade agreements pose good and bad scenarios. As stated in the
2007 WTO Report, regional trade agreements may have a negative
impact on the multilateral trade regime in that they can be exclusive,
discriminatory, and have distortive effects. 55 However, they also can
enhance free trade, maximizing regional economic opportunities. 56 The
interface among competing trade regimes may offer new opportunities
for dialogue and for the creation of new norms. For example, the
holistic approach of the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas was
unsuccessful in its implementation, particularly regarding agricultural
subsidies; however, the proliferation of bilateral and regional trade
agreements within Latin America since the Miami talks is indicative of
57
a desire for integration and participation in the global economy.
Recent challenges in the Doha Round raise concerns about whether the
multilateral trade regime can survive, particularly with respect to
agriculture, non-agricultural market access, and special safeguard
mechanisms for developing nations to counter surges in imports. 5 8 The
rise of regional and bilateral agreements, though, and the ability of
states to reach some agreement on these difficult issues illustrate that
the WTO is not dead; rather, it is very much alive through its own
dispute settlement bodies and the regional tribunals that look to WTO
adjudication for guidance and legitimacy.
B. Regime Shifting and Overlapping Regimes
The collage of trade regimes begs the question of how to manage
hybridity of tribunals and in turn, the norms and private entities that
emerge in and around them. International relations scholars describe the
emergence of various international regimes as a result of

55.

WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,

WORLD TRADE

REPORT V (2007), available at

http://www.wto.org/english/res-e/booksp-e/anrep-e/world-trade-report07e.pdf
(stating that
"[t]he complicated reality about regional agreements is that they are neither all good nor all bad").
56. Id.
57. In the last eight years, the United States has entered or has been in trade negotiations with
several Latin American countries, including Central America, Ecuador, Bolivia, Panama, and
Peru.
58. See Daniel Pruzin, WTO Members Vow to Regroup After the Collapse of Talks; USTR
Proposes 'Early Harvest' Deals, 25 INT'L TRADE REP. 1121 (2008); see also The Doha
Round.. and Round.. .and Round, ECONOMIST, July 31, 2008, at 71.
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globalization. 59 International regimes and nation-states cooperate to
address substantive issue areas of mutual concern and this contributes to
the proliferation of new principles, norms, and rules. 60 Professor
Laurence Helfer describes this phenomenon in the area of intellectual
property rights and various international regimes that contribute to
lawmaking in this area; namely, biodiversity, plant genetic resources,
public health, and human rights. 6 1 In these contexts, international
agreements such as the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 62 and the World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO) play a significant role for state and nonMore
state actors in dealing with intellectual property matters.
specifically, Professor Helfer describes the strategy of "regime shifting"
as a means for state and non-state actors to use the lawmaking quality of
international regimes to promote their individual interests. 63 As a
result, "counterregime norms" may evolve. That is, hard and soft law
of state and non-state actors contesting
standards may arise because
64
already established norms.
For purposes of the vertical and horizontal overlaps described later in
this Article, 65 the disaggregated nature of regimes in the context of
"regime shifting" and its effects on the relationship among international
66
regimes provide some insight into the legal impact of these overlaps.
In principle, the NAFIA and the WTO regimes are distinct and have
jurisdictional boundaries. Whereas the WTO dispute settlement bodies
adjudicate matters within the parameters of the WTO Covered
59. See generally ROBERT 0. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN
THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY (1984); see also Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and
Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 3, 5, 11 (Beth A. Simmons & Richard H. Steinberg eds. 2007)
(discussing international regimes). '
60. See Heifer, supra note 31, at 10-13 (describing the substantive, institutional, and relational
aspects of international regimes).
61. Id. at 9.
62. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994);
Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 46.
63. See Heifer, supra note 31, at 14 (defining regime shifting "as an attempt to alter the status
quo ante by moving treaty negotiations, lawmaking initiatives, or standard setting activities from
one international venue to another").
64. Id. (describing counterregime norms as "binding treaty rules and nonbinding soft law
standards that seek to alter the prevailing legal landscape").
65. See infra Part I.C.
66. The discussion on legal pluralism in Part IV.A is also relevant but can be distinguished in
that legal pluralism focuses on the confluence of norms arising from various communities and the
conflict that may arise; whereas, regime shifting focus on the hybridity of legal systems that may
in of themselves give rise to new norms and shift among themselves. See infra Part IV.A
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Agreements, 67 NAFTA dispute settlement bodies deal with matters
under NAFTA. However, sometimes the NAFTA treaty specifically
incorporates GATT provisions and the NAFTA tribunals may look to
68
WTO adjudication in interpreting provisions within the treaty itself.
Arguably, the United States, in going to the WTO in Mexico-Tax
Measures, engaged in an intra-regime shift regarding the issue of the

alleged national treatment violations. 69 However, in doing so, the
United States took the national treatment issue of Corn Products
International under Chapter 11 of NAFTA to the WTO where it was
within its jurisdiction to deal in alleged violations of Article III of
GATT. Though it is currently difficult to assess whether this regime
shift will necessarily result in the creation of "counterregime norms, '70
the WTO decision that the Mexican tax measures are per se a national
treatment violation has at least some political clout and may have legal
impact on the NAFTA Chapter 11 tribunal decision. Moreover, it has
pushed Mexico and the United States to discuss their sugar disputes and
attempt to reach diplomatic solutions. 71 In this context, the tendency of
Chapter 11 investment regimes to look to WTO adjudication of parallel
substantive areas in assessing alleged violations under NAFTA is a nonbinding soft law standard that seeks to establish a "bottom-up
coordination" from regional tribunals toward the multilateral WTO
regime.
While "regime shifting" tends to best describe the negotiations stage
of treaty-making and more informal international agreements,
particularly agreements that arise from unrelated regimes, it also
provides a helpful lens for better understanding the movement that
occurs between trade and investment regimes in matters of adjudication.
Though trade and investment regimes may be two sides of the same
coin, it could also be argued that transplanting WTO interpretations of

67. See GATT,supra note 7, art. 23.
68. See, e.g., NAFTA, supra note 5, art. 301 (incorporating GAT provisions). For more
discussion on ways the NAFTA Chapter II tribunals look to GAT adjudication of national
treatment in interpreting article 1102 of the NAFTA, see Trujillo, supra note 10, at 238-49.
69. See Heifer, supra note 31, at 16 (describing state strategy to move "negotiations of new
free trade obligations from a multilateral treaty to a regional trade pact or to a web of bilateral
trade agreements" as an "intra-regime shift").
70. See id. at 14 (defining "counterregime norms" as "binding treaty rules and nonbinding soft
law standards that seek to alter the prevailing legal landscape" and allows states and NGOS to
"contest established normative orthodoxies").
71. See Rossella Brevetti & Michael 0. Boyle, Grassley, U.S. Industry Welcome Agreement
with Mexico on Sugar, HFCS, 23 INT'L TRADE REP. 1168, 1168 (Aug. 3, 2006). But see Rossella
Brevetti, Sugar Policy Alliance Urges Rejection of Industry NAFTA Proposal in Farm Bill, 25
INT'L TRADE REP. 129 (Jan. 24, 2008).
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national treatment under GATT into investor-state disputes is a form of
inter-regime shift,72 rather than intra-regime. This in turn has helped to
solidify the judicialization of WTO jurisprudence and enhance its
legitimacy vis a vis regional tribunals and nation-states.
The next section will more specifically describe the inter-systemic
overlaps between the trade and investment regimes of the WTO and
NAFFA and attempt to unpack them.
C. Vertical and Horizontal Overlaps

In describing the inter-systemic overlaps of the multilateral and the
regional, this section borrows from Professor Alan Sykes, who
distinguishes between what he calls "private right[s] of action" for
foreign investors and "public rights of action" for governments bringing
trade disputes. 73 These two rights of action have different enforcement
mechanisms: private rights of action having monetary damages (by
governments to private investors) in contrast with public rights of action
where there is no direct remedy of enforcement except through
In this context, Professor Sykes describes the
retaliation. 74
public/private divide in terms of their varying enforcement mechanisms.
Whereas a government may have standing before the adjudicatory body
of the WTO, a private investor with a stake in the dispute may only
petition an adjudicatory body under an investment regime, such as
under Chapter 11 NAFTA or Chapter 10 of CAFTA.75 Though the
remedies may vary, it is the domestic government which must enforce
either award. In borrowing these distinctions of public/private rights of
actions, this Article defines "public" as incorporating rights of action
that can only be brought by state actors. 76 However, it does not
discount that non-state actors may in fact influence the state in bringing
such cause of actions in the first place. 77 Though this Article's

72.

See Heifer, supra note 31, at 16 (describing inter-regime shift as the movement of rules

and/or negotiations from one venue to a different regime; for example, when a state "introduces
rules to protect the global environment into an intergovernmental organization previously devoted
to lowering trade barriers").
73. See Sykes, supra note 16, at 2.
74. Id.
75. See id. (distinguishing between parties choosing between "public and private enforcement
of law"). Professor Sykes states: "The choice becomes relevant once parties to an international
agreement elect to allow an adjudicatory body to hear complaints. They may then reserve to
themselves the exclusive right to petition that body (public enforcement), or allow private actors

with a stake in the dispute to petition it (private enforcement)." Id.
76. See Lan Cao, Culture Change, 47 VA. J. INT'L L. 357, 373 (2007) (stating general
principle that public international law deals only with state actors).
77. See SHAFFER, supra note 3, at 6 (describing the private/public agreements that stimulate
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objective is not focused on incorporating these non-state actors into the
description of public rights of action, it does recognize the important
role they play in bringing these public rights of action in the first
78
place.
Within this context, we see Vertical Overlaps where specific trade
issues at the regional level converge with those at the international. The
U.S. -CanadaSoftwood Lumber Dispute demonstrates this phenomenon.
It arose as a trade dispute regarding Canadian subsidies on the Canadian
softwood lumber industry which led to countervailing duties placed by
the U.S. government on softwood lumber imports from Canada. This
ongoing dispute began under Chapter 19 of NAFIA as a countervailing
duty dispute and then was taken to the WTO by both countries at
different points in time. 79 Another example of a public right of action,
resolved both regionally and multilaterally (vertically) is Antidumping
Investigation on Imports on High Fructose Corn Syrup Originating
from the United States of America.80 Unlike in Softwood Lumber
though, the WTO and NAFTA panels agreed in their resolution of the
Imports on High Fructose Corn Syrup case and Mexico was found in
violation. 8 1 See Illustration 1, Appendix.
There are also adjudicatory overlaps particularly in the regional
context-horizontal overlaps consisting of government-to-government
trade disputes (public rights of action) that may evolve into private
rights of actions for foreign investors. Because of the proximity of

state actors to bring WTO litigation, such as antidumping or countervailing duty litigation).
78. For example, private actors such as firms, corporations, and trade groups can bring an
antidumping dispute before the U.S. Trade Representative to investigate the matter. It is then the
U.S. Trade Representative, on the part of these private actors, which brings the dispute before a
tribunal under Chapter 19 of NAFTA.
79. In dealing with U.S. countervailing duties placed on imports of Canadian softwood
lumber, this case involved a WTO panel and NAFTA panels making determinations on
countervailing duties. The NAFTA Chapter 19 panel agreed with Canada and found "no injury"
to the U.S. softwood lumber industry. The extraordinary challenge committee under NAFI'A
also found the countervailing duties invalid. The WTO as well originally agreed with the
Canadians. But, the U.S. decided not to abide by the NAFTA decision, justifying its actions
under a safeguard mechanism. On August 30, 2006, the VTO upheld the U.S. choice by
supporting the U.S. International Trade Commission's Section 129 "threat of injury" ruling.
NAFTA panel proceedings were thereby suspended. See NAFTA Panel, In the Matter of Certain
Softwood Lumber Product from Canada, U.S.-Can.-2002-1904-02, 2006 WL 4041527 (NAFTA
Binational Panel 2006); see also Northern Ontario Business, "Ontario Lumber Groups Sue Over
Softwood," 2006 WLNR 11191442, June 1, 2006 (stating that the Ontario Lumber Manufacturers
Association and the Ontario Forest Industries Association were filing actions challenging the
Canadian and U.S. decision to suspend NAFTA panel proceedings regarding softwood lumber).
80. Imports of High Fructose Corn Syrup, supra note 20.
81. See id.; see also Mexico-Anti-Dumping Investigation of High Fructose Corn Syrup from
the United States, WT/DS I32/R (Jan. 28, 2000) (adopted Feb. 25, 2000).
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interests among free traders and private investors, a trade issue such as
an antidumping dispute may give rise to an investor-state dispute. For
example, the well-known Softwood Lumber Dispute between the United
States and Canada again illustrates this phenomenon. As mentioned
above, the Softwood Lumber Dispute was a trade problem dealing with
82
U.S. countervailing duties on Canadian imports of softwood lumber.
Under NAFTA, investor-state disputes also arose out of the problem.
Pope & Talbot v. Canada is one example in which a U.S. investor in
Canadian softwood lumber alleged Chapter 11 violations under NAFITA
due to Canadian export bans on softwood lumber. 83 Such a ban was
enacted against the backdrop of a 1996 U.S.-Canadian Softwood
Lumber agreement. Other similar foreign investment disputes include
the so-called "Softwood Lumber cases" where several Canadian
companies (Canfor, Tember, and Terminal) brought complaints against
the U.S. government under NAFTA's foreign-investment chapter for
passing countervailing duties on imports. 84 But in these early cases, the
NAFIA tribunal was forced to decide on matters of jurisdiction and
whether trade disputes could be "transplanted" into the investor-state
dispute arena.
The NAFIA investor-state tribunal clarified that
antidumping and countervailing duty policies were not to be considered
in the investor-state arena. Already in the early years of NAFRFA,
regional tribunals had a perceived need to unpack public rights of action
from private ones-trade matters from investment ones. However,
these cases also illustrate that government trade disputes may in fact
transform into private disputes involving foreign investors, and that
government attempts to resolve those trade disputes may also impact
foreign investment. For at some level, minimizing trade barriers goes
hand in hand with increased foreign investment. See Illustration 2,
Appendix.
Another kind of overlap, the vertical/horizontal overlaps may occur
simultaneously, particularly when dealing with certain international
substantive law issues that implicate domestic regulatory fiscal or nonfiscal measures. These instances are primarily of a vertical and
hierarchical nature with respect to regional agreements and the

82. See NAFTA Panel, In the Matter of Certain Softwood Lumber Product from Canada,
U.S.-Can.-2002-1904-02, 2006 WL 4041527 (NAFTA Binational Panel 2006).
83. Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, Interim Award, T 78 (NAFr'A Ch. II Arb. Trib. June 26,
2000) [hereinafter Pope & Talbot].
84. Order for the Termination of the Arbitral Proceedings with Respect to Tembec et al.
(NAFrA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. Jan. 10, 2006), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/68085.pdf.
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multilateral regime, but the substantive issues can be of a nature that cut
across trade issues horizontally as well.
One example is Corn Products International, which began as an
antidumping dispute between Mexico and the United States regarding
Mexican antidumping measures against the importation of U.S. high
fructose corn syrup (HFCS). In Corn Products International,a U.S.
investor in HFCS with the largest share of the market in Mexico
brought an investor-state claim against the Mexican government after it
passed a tax on Mexican soda bottlers using HFCS, but not those using
sugar. 85 Subsequently in 2004, the U.S. government alleged national
treatment violations as a matter of GATT law (not NAFTA) in the
WTO case, Mexico-Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other
Beverages.86 Specifically, the U.S. alleged that the tax violated Article
III of GATT because it treated "like and directly competitive or
substitutable products" differently. 87 The WTO panel and appellate
body found Mexico in violation of national treatment requirements
under GATT. These decisions were made prior to any resolution of the
As onlookers await the
investor-state dispute under NAFTA.
by
the NAFTA Chapter 11
granted
recently
award
of
the
publication
tribunal, it is unclear the impact that an affirmative finding of national
treatment violations at the multilateral level will have on a private
action at the regional level. However, NAFTA Chapter 11 tribunals
have been known to defer to WTO interpretations of Article III of
GATT in deciding whether measures affect investments in "like
circumstances" at the regional level. 8 8 See Illustration 3, Appendix.
In this one dispute, a public right of action (government to
government), the Imports on High Fructose Corn Syrup case, is
converging with a private right of action (private investor against the
Moreover, there are vertical/horizontal substantive
government).
convergences regarding the issue of national treatment, in which the
private right of action commencing at the regional level becomes a
85. See Corn Products International,supra note 19, 54.
86. WTO Panel Report, Mexico-Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages
(Mexico-Taxes on Soft Drinks), WT/DS308/R (Mar. 24, 2006).
87. See Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the United States, Mexico-Tax Measures
on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, WT/DS08/4 (June 11, 2004) (where the claimant alleged
violations under Article 11: 1, 111:2 and 111:4 of GATT).
88. See Trujillo, supra note 10, at 227-32 (discussing examples of cases in which chapter I I
NAFTA tribunals have looked to WTO adjudication of GATI Article III to assess alleged
national treatment violations under article 1102 of NAFTA); see, e.g., Pope & Talbot, supra note
83; S.D Myers, Inc. v. Canada, Partial Award, 40 I.L.M. 1408 (NAFTA Ch. II Arb. Trib. Nov.
13, 2000); GAMI Investments, Inc. v. Mexico, Final Award (NAFTA Ch. II Arb. Trib. Nov. 15,
2004), availableat http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/ 38789.pdf.
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public right of action between governments before the WTO. In this
unique instance, not only are there horizontal overlaps across
jurisdictional venues-antidumping disputes impacting foreign
investors-but also vertical jurisdictional overlaps with respect to
national treatment. See Illustration 4, Appendix.
D. The "Methanex Effect" Unpacks Vertical/HorizontalOverlaps
The recent 2005 investor-state dispute under NAFTA, Methanex
Corporationv. United States of America,8 9 attempted to distinguish the
jurisdictional sphere of the private rights of action under regional
agreements from those under the public rights of action under the WTO
dispute resolution bodies. This may be called the "Methanex effect."
In deciding whether California bans on the use of methanol for
reformulated gasoline violated commitments under Chapter 11 of
NAFIA including national treatment, the regional tribunal concluded
that the drafters of NAFFA did not intend that "trade provisions . . . be
transported to investment provisions." 90 Unlike prior Chapter 11
NAFFA tribunals that tended to look to WTO definitions of national
treatment under its "like products" test, this regional tribunal asserted its
independence and authority in dealing with private rights of action,
separate from decisions of the WTO. Despite the Canadian claimant's
attempts to use interpretations of "like products" under Article III of
GATT to show the similarity between ethanol and methanol
investments, the NAFTA tribunal stated that the comparator should not
be as between ethanol and methanol producers, but between other
methanol producers since the purpose of the ban-to avoid a legitimate
91
health and environmental hazard-was relevant here.
Finally, the Methanex tribunal took an aggressive stance regarding
regionalism: it stated that the "like products" test under Article III of
GATT should not necessarily apply to "like circumstances" under
Article 1102 of NAFTA. 9 2 In other words, the regional tribunal

89. Methanex Corp. v. United States, Final Award of the Tribunal on Jurisdiction and Merits,
12 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. Aug. 3 2005), available at http://www.state.gov/documentsl
organization/51052.pdf.
90. Id. at Part IV, ch. B 37.
91. Id. at Part IV, ch. B 17.
92. See Trujillo, supra note 10, at 253; see also Nicholas DiMascio & Joost Pauwelyn,
Nondiscrimination in Trade and Investment Treaties: Worlds Apart or Two Sides of the Same
Coin?, 102 AM. J. INT'L L. 48, 75 (2008) (stating that the tribunal's conclusion in Methanex was
to compare the foreign investment in question to a domestic investment that is like the foreign
investment for all purposes other than nationality and therefore, "the effect of the MTBE ban on
Methanex was to be compared only to its effect upon domestic methanol producers").
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unpacked the substantive legal overlaps previously established by other
Chapter 11 claimants and NAFTA foreign investment tribunals.
Furthermore, the implication of this decision was to also unpack not
only vertical overlaps but also horizontal overlaps between public rights
of action under trade and private rights of actions under private
investment. Clearly though, the regional tribunal recognized that
national treatment issues do overlap with domestic regulatory measures,
and in deferring to the legitimate purpose of the methanol ban, decided
that in fact, this measure was not discriminatory. See Illustration 5,
Appendix.
The next section will more specifically discuss national treatment and
the significance that the vertical/horizontal overlap has on this
substantive trade issue, and in turn, domestic regulatory policy.

II.

INVESTMENT, TRADE, AND REGULATORY MEASURES

Regulatory frameworks are defined by domestic governments.
Within a federal system such as the United States, these frameworks
tend to overlap at the state and federal levels in implementation,
adjudication, and enforcement of the measures they engender. Spheres
of jurisdiction are not easy to define, even at the domestic level. U.S.
electrical markets, for example, come under the federal umbrella of
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), but are "managed" by
state administrative agencies. FERC reforms in 1996, and later in 2005,
converted previously vertically integrated firms for the generation,
transmission, and distribution of electricity into "partially regulated"
It is difficult for courts to distinguish between
entities. 9 3
anticompetitive behavior initiated by state action and therefore
permissive and that initiated by private actors and therefore,
problematic vis A vis federal antitrust laws. For example, expansive
applications of U.S. state action immunity doctrine that exempts stateregulated industries from antitrust liability may actually further the
suppliers already established in a
effects of capture in dominant
94
traditionally regulated market.

93. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 824-824(n) (2006); Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Order No.
385 (1996); see also Harry First, Regulated Deregulation: The New York
888, 18 C.F.R.
Experience in Electric Utility Deregulation, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 911 (2002) (describing
electricity deregulation as a "regulated deregulation"); Elizabeth Trujillo, State Action Antitrust
Exemption Collides with Deregulation: Rehabilitating the Foreseeability Doctrine, II FORDHAM
J. CORP. & FIN. L. 349 (2006) (discussing FERC reforms and implications on state action antitrust
immunity for investor-owned utilities in the context of partial deregulation).
94. See Trujillo, supra note 94, at 353 (proposing that broad applications of the state action
immunity doctrine by courts assists dominant suppliers at the expense of market entrants).
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In the transnational context, whereas regional tribunals seem well
aware of the jurisdictional and substantive overlaps and the impact
WTO decisions may have on regional disputes, for the most part, WTO
panels choose to ignore them, at least in the context of national
treatment violations. 95 Regional agreements such as NAFTA and the
Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) 9 6 incorporate WTO
jurisprudence into their own commitments, and in some instances, allow
parties to choose to resolve a dispute under the auspices of the WTO
rather than a regional dispute resolution body. 97 In this way, regional
agreements exercise a form of "bottom-up coordination" with the WTO.
In the area of government-to-government trade disputes, we have seen
NAFIA Chapter 19 panels making determinations in conjunction with
WTO adjudication of the same countervailing or antidumping duties. In
some instances, such as the final determination of Imports on High
Fructose Corn Syrup, the regional tribunals and the WTO panels agree
on the outcome. 9 8 Softwood Lumber, on the other hand, has been more
challenging for WTO and regional panels alike.
In order to understand the importance of defining these jurisdictional
overlaps, it is helpful to delve into WTO adjudication of domestic
regulatory measures under Article III of GATT.
A. The GATT Regime and National Treatment
In making national treatment determinations, WTO panels primarily
focus on whether products imported into a territory are "accorded
treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products of
national origin." 9 9 Specifically, fiscal measures may not be applied "in
excess of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic
products,"' 10 0 and all measures, fiscal and non-fiscal, "should not be
applied to imported or domestic products so as to afford protection to
domestic production."''0 Therefore, key to making national treatment

95.

But see Brazil-Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, WT/DS332IR (2007)

[hereinafter Brazil-Retreaded Tyres AB] (the WTO appellate body considered whether an
exception granted under the MERCOSUR justified a Brazilian regulation favoring domestic
retreaded tires).
96. MERCOSUR Free Trade Agreement, Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR)
Agreement, Mar. 26, 1991 [hereinafter MERCOSUR], available at http://www.worldtradelaw
.net/fta/agreements/mercosurfta.pdf
97. See, e.g., NAFTA, supra note 5, ch. 20; MERCOSUR, supra note 96.
98. NAFTA Chapter 19 Tribunal, Mex.-U.S.-98-1904-01.
99. GATT supra note 7, art. III, 4.
100. Id. 2.
101. Id.% 1.
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determinations is the meaning of "like products" in any given case. In
simple terms, the first question posed by the panel in Mexico-Tax

Measures was whether Mexican sugar was "like" high fructose corn
syrup. Is the fact that they both function as sweeteners enough to prove
their "likeness" under Article III, or should other factors be taken into
consideration such as their physical make-up and tariff classification?
Furthermore, should the purpose of the tax be entered into the equation

of "likeness?"
WTO panels have struggled with these questions in defining
"likeness" in this context over the years. Generally, they take a

narrower approach that focuses on 1) the physical characteristics of a
product including its properties, nature, and quality; 2) the end-uses of a
product in any given market; 3) the tastes and habits of consumers'
of the
tastes and habits, which may vary; and 4) the tariff classification
10 2

products (also known as the Border Tax Adjustment criteria).

However, at times they have expanded the meaning of "like" to
incorporate the "aim and effect" of the measure at hand. 10 3 Most
recently, they continue to focus on the Border Tax Adjustment criteria;
however, there is a willingness to consider the purpose of the regulatory
measure in determining the "likeness" of the104products, particularly in

instances where health is the primary concern.
While WTO panels have jumped back and forth from a formalist

reading of "like products" under Article 1m1 to a more contextualized one
that considers the "aim and effects" of the measure in question, 10 5 one

case demonstrates the panels' ability to compromise between the two

18, L/2464 (adopted
102. See Report of the Working Party on Border Tax Adjustments,
Dec. 2, 1970); see also Appellate Body Report, Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages,
WT/DS8/AB/R (Oct. 4, 1996) [hereinafter 1996 Japan Alcoholic Beverages Appellate Body].
103. See United States Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt-Beverages, WT/DS23/R39S/206 (Mar. 16, 1992) (adopted June 19, 1992) [hereinafter U.S.-Malt Beverages]. In
determining whether U.S. tax schemes and transportation restrictions on alcoholic beverages were
in violation of national treatment commitments under GAT' Article III, the GATT panel in U.S. Malt Beverages considered whether U.S. measures were enacted with the aim and the effect to
protect a U.S. industry. This decision was ground-breaking for GATT panels because it
established the "aims and effects" test in order for GATT panels to consider the protectionist
intent behind domestic measures. This test was then rejected by a subsequent 1996 Appellate
Body decision, Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages. See also Trujillo, supra note 10 at 217-21
(discussing the differences in the analysis of national treatment in these two cases).
104. See, e.g., European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos and AsbestosContaining Products, WT/DSI35/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001) [hereinafter EC-Asbestos], reprinted in
40 I.L.M. 1193 (2001).
105. See generally Henrik Horn & Petros Mavroidis, Still Hazy After All These Years: The
Interpretation of National Treatment in the GATT/WTO Case-law on Tax Discrimination, 15
EUR. J. INT'L L. 39 (2004).
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extremes. In European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos
andAsbestos-ContainingProducts, the Appellate Body opened the door
for expanding the meaning of "like products" without reinstating the
"aims and effects" test of U.S. -Malt Beverages.
Canada brought this case against France, challenging a French decree
that prohibited importation of asbestos and products with asbestos fibers
and imposed penalties for violation of the decree. 10 6 The Appellate
Body agreed with the European Community's understanding of "like"
in this context. It stressed that within the purpose of Article III was the
need to look into the legitimacy of regulatory policy itself. 10 7 That is,
the "very reason why the [d]ecree single[d] out asbestos fibers; namely,
the fact that asbestos fibers [were] carcinogenic" was an important
point. 10 8 It based its comparison on larger categories than the products
themselves; specifically, the French decree denied competitive
opportunities equally to "all carcinogenic asbestos [fibers]." 10 9 In this
way, the determination of "likeness" would not establish the
discrimination; rather, a conclusive finding of "likeness" would only
allow a deeper look into its discriminatory effects and its impact on
trade. The Appellate Body therefore contextualized the French decree
and its understanding of "likeness" in this regard.
This reading of Article III allows a panel to balance the regulatory
measure itself with its impact on trade. As in earlier WTO cases, the
focus was on their competitive relationship and market
substitutability;1 10 however, it found that the effect of the regulatory
measure on the products' market relationship could impact their
substitutability. ll

106. The claimants alleged that this decree violated the Agreement on Technical Barriers to
Trade (TBT Agreement) as well as various provisions of GATT, including Article III.For
overview of EC-Asbestos and a comparison to other Article III jurisprudence under the WTO, see
Elizabeth Trujillo, supra note 10, at 214-25.
107. EC-Asbestos, supra note 104,1 32.
108. Id.
109. Id. 33. The opinion states that the European Community's interpretation of "like"
concluded that, "instead of comparing the products prohibited by the French Decree at issue (all
carcinogenic asbestos fibers), the Panel erroneously compared the allegedly 'like' products with
an arbitrary third category of products, namely 'fibers with certain applications."' Id.
110. Id. $ 103.
111. See Robert Howse & Elisabeth Tuerck, The WTO Impact on Internal Regulations: A
Case Study of the Canada-EC Asbestos Dispute, in THE EU AND THE WTO: LEGAL AND
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 283, 288 (Grinne de Bdirca & Joanne Scott eds., 2001), available at
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/articles/howseasbestos.pdf (stating that the Appellate body in ECAsbestos reaffirmed the "basic purpose of Article III as the discipline of protectionist measures"
and not only guaranteed "market access" of like imported products).

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 40

Traditional narrow and formalist interpretations of national treatment
by WTO panels (except perhaps in life threatening situations) fail to
consider that virtually any domestic regulatory measure is protectionist
to some degree. Furthermore, it discounts the rippling effect of WTO
adjudication of these measures at the regional and domestic levels,
particularly if these entities defer to WTO jurisprudence.
B. NAFTA Chapter 11 Foreign Investment Regime
In the context of private rights of action under the foreign investment
chapter of NAFTA Chapter 11, the tendency of claimants and NAFTA
tribunals has been to look to WTO interpretations of national treatment
standards. More specifically, in order to define "like circumstances"
under Article 1102,112 NAFTA tribunals refer to the "directly
competitive or substitutable" standard of the "like products" test under
Article III of GATT. This is not to say that a NAFTA Chapter 11
tribunal will automatically adopt a WTO adjudication of national
treatment; however, they do tend to incorporate WTO panel
interpretations of national treatment into their own understandings of
national treatment, even if they may look to other regimes (such as the
Bilateral Investment Treaty regime) as well. 11 3 In doing so, the
NAFTA tribunals seem to contribute toward legitimizing the WTO
panels and their jurisprudence.
WTO trade panels can learn from NAFTA foreign investment panels
in their deferential approaches toward domestic regulatory structures.
In other words, NAFTA tribunals seem to recognize the overlaps
generated by free trade agreements with domestic regulatory
processes. 1 14 They do not simply discount the possibility of certain

112. See NAFTA, supra note 5, art. 1102 (stating that no Party may treat a foreign investor's
investment less favorably than it treats its own investments in "like circumstances").
113. NAFTA Chapter 11 panels have also considered the meaning of "like situations" as
adopted by the OECD as well as a number of bilateral investment treaty [BIT] decisions in
deciding national treatment cases under NAFTA. They also tend to consider the regulatory
context of a regulation in interpreting "like circumstances," whereas the WTO panels look
primarily to the competitive substitutability of the products in question. For more discussion, see
supra note 6. For more discussion regarding the principle of non-discrimination in international
law of foreign investment, see generally A.F.M. Maniruzzaman, Expropriation of Alien Property
and the Principle of Non-Discrimination in International Law of Foreign Investment: An
Overview, 8 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 57 (1998).
114. See Patrisia Isela Hansen, Dispute Settlement in the NAFTA and Beyond, 40 TEX. INT'L
L. J. 417, 422-23 (2005) (stating that NAFTA tribunals also tend to defer to "prior rulings by
domestic tribunals" and explaining that tribunals will consider whether the claimant has
exhausted all domestic remedies before challenging a domestic tribunal's decision). For an
example, see The Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, 42
I.L.M. 811 (June 26, 2003).

2009]

Public/Private Overlaps in Trade

regulatory measures being legitimate and therefore, acceptable under
115
the Article 1102 national treatment requirement.
For example, S.D. Myers, a U.S. investor in the business of treating
Canadian polycholinated biphenyls (PCB) waste, brought a Chapter 11
116
action against the Canadian government for prohibiting PCB exports.
After reviewing records from the Canadian Ministry of Environment,
the tribunal found that the intent of the export ban was to protect the
Canadian. PCB disposal industry, while recognizing that there were
indirect but legitimate environmental objectives to the ban. 117 Despite
Canada's attempt to comply with its environmental commitments under
the Basel Convention, the NAFTA tribunal, after carefully assessing
whether the measure 1) had the effect of discriminating on the basis of
nationality, and 2) was facially discriminatory, decided that the
Canadian government did not prove that this measure
was the "least
118
restrictive means" of achieving a regulatory objective.
In yet another Chapter 11 case, Pope and Talbot, a US investor
accused Canada of violating its national treatment commitments under
NAFrA.
Canadian fee structures and permit requirements,
implemented in accordance with the Canada-US Softwood Lumber
Agreement, impacted Pope & Talbot's investments. However, the
tribunal, in alluding to the Article III "like products" test, dismissed the
1102 allegation by creating a two-tier analysis under 1102. First, the
tribunal considered whether in fact there was a de facto discriminatory
measure (facially neutral), and second, it considered the regulatory
processes at play in the "like circumstances" analysis. Therefore, if the
foreign and domestic investments were in fact "in the same business or
economic sector," and were treated differently, the presumption was
that they were in "like circumstances." However, the respondent would
have an opportunity to show "a reasonable nexus to rational government
policies" that do not distinguish between foreign and domestic owned
companies, and do not otherwise undermine the trade objectives of
NAFTA. 119 Again, in Pope & Talbot, the NAFTA Chapter 11 tribunal
not only deferred to interpretations of national treatment under Article

115. See generally Trujillo, supra note 10.
116. S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, Partial Award, 40 LL.M. 1408,
245-246 (NAFTA Ch. 11
Arb. Trib. 2001).
117. Id.
118. S.D. Myers v. Canada, Final Award (NAFTA ch. 11 Arb. Trib. Oct. 21, 2002), available
at http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/assets/pdfs/MyersFinal
Award-Final-30-12-02.pdf. See also Trujillo, supra note 10.
119. See Pope & Talbot, supra note 83,
78-79.
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III of GATT, but also formulated its own analysis which accounted for
legitimate regulatory objectives.
More recent NAFTA Chapter 11 cases seem to follow a similar
analysis; however, the focus on domestic regulatory processes seems to
be on the rise. Gami Investments, Inc. v. Government of Mexico is one

example in which the NAFTA tribunal considered the fact that a
Mexican law liberalizing the traditionally regulated sugar industries also
allowed for governmental supervision and protection from financial
121
crisis. 120 No national treatment violations were found in this case.
Another example, outside of NAFTA, can be found in the investment
regime established under the Ecuador-U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaty
(BIT).

In Occidental Exploration & Production Co. v. Republic of

Ecuador,122 the investment tribunal looked to Ecuadorian law to
determine whether the U.S. investments in question should only be
compared to domestic investments in the same business sector. Since
Ecuadorian law did not allow investments in different sectors to be
treated differently regarding VAT tax refunds (the measure in question),
the tribunal compared the U.S. investment to all investments affected by
the VAT law in question. In doing so, the tribunal found that the
Ecuadorian government treated the U.S. investment in a discriminatory
fashion. 123 More importantly though, the investment tribunal deferred
to the regulatory context at hand to determine how to best compare this
foreign investment to domestic ones. 124
C. But What About GATTArticle XX?

Though outside the scope of this Article, it is important to mention
that NAFTA and other regional and bilateral trade agreements do not
incorporate a trade provision comparable to GATT Article XX. 125 This
provision exempts certain domestic measures that would otherwise be in
violation of national treatment requirements under GATT.126 Much has

120. Gami Investments Inc. v. Gov't of Mexico, Final Award of the Tribunal (NAFTA Ch. II
Arb. Trib. Nov. 15, 2004).
121. See id.
122. Occidental Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Republic of Ecuador, Award, 173 (London Ct.
Int'l Arb. July 1, 2004).
123. Id.
124. See Nicholas DiMascio & Joost Pauwelyn, Nondiscrimination in Trade and Investment
Treaty, 102 AM. J. INT'L L. 48 (2008) (stating that the test applied by the BIT tribunal in
Occidental was a significant departure from the traditional "business or economic sector test" of
other investment tribunal decisions).
125. GATT, supra note 7, art. XX.
126. Id.
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been written on Article XX and this Article will not detail its intricacies.
However, it is relevant to the overlapping construct outlined in this
Article. Because regional agreements do not contain a comparable
exception for measures that would otherwise be construed as national
treatment violations, regional tribunals must rely on the national
treatment provisions of the applicable regional trade agreement in order
to determine whether a regulatory measure is in fact in violation. In
doing so, WTO interpretations of GATT Article III become more
relevant.
Generally speaking, Article XX establishes a narrow framework
under which certain domestic measures, though having discriminatory
effects, may be permitted under GATT if those measures are the "least
restrictive means" of obtaining the legitimate governmental
objective. 12 7 It includes areas such as the protection of human, animal,
and plant health, and the protection of natural resources and national
treasures of artistic and archaeological value. 128 One of the most
challenging sections of Article XX is the so-called chapeau part of the
provision.1 29 Though permissible measures under Article XX may have
some discriminatory effects, they may not constitute "a means of
' 130
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination."
In one recent case, Brazil-Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded
Tyres, the WTO panel and Appellate Body had to consider whether

127. Robert E. Hudec, GATT/WTO Constraints on National Regulation: Requiem for an
"Aims and Effects" Test, 32 INT'L LAW. 619, 621-22 (1998) [hereinafter Hudec, GATT/WTO
Contraints]. Most cases involving decisions on Article XX involve facially discriminatory
measures (de jure) and are upheld as satisfying the "necessity" requirement of Article XX, which
means that the regulatory measures are inherently compelling. See id. See also Joel P.
Trachtman, Regulatory Jurisdiction and the WTO, 10 J. INT'L ECON. L. 631, 641 (2007). See
also generally Robert E. Hudec, Enforcing International Trade Law 373-585 (1993).
128. GATT, supra note 7, art. XX. Exceptions to Article XX are construed narrowly. See
Joel P. Trachtman, The Domain of WTO Dispute Resolution, 40 HARV. INT'L L.J. 333 (1999).
129. The chapeau states the following:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where
the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in
this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any
contracting party of measures ....
GATT, supra note 7, art. XX.
130. Id. See generally Hudec, GATT/WTO Constraints, supra note 127, at 620, 626-29. See
also Trachtman, supra note 179, at 636 (discussing the US-Shrimp case in which the Appellate
Body stressed that the chapeau in article XX invoked the delicate balance between the right of
member states to come under an exception under Article XX and "the substantive rights of other
members under GATT rules"). See generally Appellate Body Report, United States-Import
Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, T1 156-160, WT DS 58/AB/R (Nov. 6,
1998).
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Article XX permitted an exemption under MERCOSUR. 13 1 The
dispute was about Brazil's ban on imports of retreaded tires due to
environmental and health concerns surrounding the tires. Furthermore,
Brazil defended its position as being sustainable under an exemption
under the MERCOSUR allowing bans on the importation of retreaded
tires into the MERCOSUR region. 132 The WTO panel decision found
the measure to be legitimate and necessary to further Brazil's
environmental objective.' 33 However, it also agreed with the European
Union's allegation that the ban was implemented in a way that would
discriminate against non-MERCOSUR members. 134 However, the
WTO panel disagreed that it was arbitrary and unjustifiable
discrimination under the chapeau.135 Ultimately the panel did find that
the ban constituted a disguised restriction on trade. The Appellate
Body, though, rejected the narrow application of the Article XX
chapeau in this case, which balanced the effects of the ban by
considering the volume of imports affected with the environmental
objective of the ban. 136 The Appellate Body instead found that the ban
was applied in an arbitrary and unjustifiable way, and it was not the
least restrictive means of executing the policy objective.
This case was the first dealing with recycled waste products and had
implications for environment and trade policy. However, equally
important was the fact that the WTO panel did consider the exemption
under a regional trade agreement such as MERCOSUR. Furthermore,
the Appellate Body explicitly recognized that Brazil's attempt to
comply with exemptions under MERCOSUR was not in itself arbitrary.
Also, it clarified that Brazil could have sought to justify the ban under
Article 50(d) of the Treaty of Montevideo. 137 In these ways, some
reciprocal deference was shown. However, the strict application of
Article XX by the Appellate Body forced Brazil to make a choice:
either comply with the exemption of MERCOSUR and be in violation

131.

See Brazil-RetreadedTyres AB, supra note 95.

132. See id. 1 3 and note 8 (describing the exemption provided in Article 40 of Portaria
SECEX 14/2004 and Article 1 of Presidential Decree 4.592 of February 11, 2003). The members
of MERCOSUR include Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay.
133.

See

WT/DS332/R,

Panel

Report,

Brazil-Measures Affecting

Imports of Retreaded Tyres,

7.215, (June 12, 2007) [hereinafter, Brazil-Retreaded Tyres Panel Report],

upheld under Brazil-RetreadedTyres AB, supra note 95, %211-212.
134. Brazil-Retreaded Tyres Panel Report, supra note 133, T 7.289.

135. Id. 1$ 7.354-.355.
136. See id. %"T
224-234.
137. See id. 14.319, 4.321-322.
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of the GATT, or be in violation of MERCOSUR in order to comply
with this decision by the WTO Appellate Body.
Arguably, Article XX, in combination with the Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) and Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT)
138
agreements, would allow legitimate regulatory measures to survive.
However, the narrow scope of the provision does little to distinguish
between legitimate and illegitimate regulatory measures or define the
139
extent of protectionism that GATT will actually tolerate.
Furthermore, many regional agreements, such as NAFTA, do not
contain a comparable provision; 140 therefore, the determination of the
legitimacy of a regulation comes under the national treatment
provisions. In these cases, claimants and tribunals will look to WTO
interpretations of Article III, rendering this provision particularly
important for regional understandings of national treatment and, in turn,
adjudication of regulatory measures.
A more contextualized approach by WTO panels toward Article III is
important if only to create a more top-down coordination with regional
tribunals, such as NAFTA and, in turn, more participation by member
states in the adjudication of their own regulatory measures. 141 This
aspect of top-down coordination will be discussed later in the section on
142
reciprocal deference.
III. MANAGING THE OVERLAPPING REGIME CONSTRUCT

In sum, WTO adjudication of trade matters that affect the ability to
pass domestic regulatory measures can impact the outcome of an
investor-state dispute-that is, it can indirectly influence arbitral panels
at the regional level on whether or not to grant monetary damages to a
foreign investor. Generally speaking, free trade agreements thrive with
the implementation of domestic pro-competitive policies in traditionally
regulated markets. It is not irrelevant that the need for Mexico to have
access to U.S. markets for surplus sugar production arose from a

138. See Trachtman, supra note 127, at 639 (stating that at the negotiations of the WTO, the
TBT agreement, the SPS Agreement, and the GATS provisions supporting mutual recognition
and harmonization of regulation were included).
139. See Trujillo, supra note 10, at 231-32. See generally Hudec, GATIWTO Constraints,
supra note 127, at 621-23.
140. However, MERCOSUR does contain Article 50(d) of the Treaty of Montevideo which is
similar to the provisions under GATT Article XX(b), allowing exemptions for measures dealing
with health of human, plant, and animal life. MERCOSUR, supra note 96.
141. See Trujillo, supra note 10, at 234-38 (arguing for a more contextualized approach by
WTO panels in their application of GATT Article Il).
142. See infra Part III.C (discussing reciprocal deference).
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regulatory structure in Mexico that traditionally protected Mexican
43
sugar. 1
Given that the WTO can only work within the parameters of its
Covered Agreements, the WTO system must also rely on its member
states to promote these multilateral goals at the domestic level. Even if
the WTO is a central regulatory commission for trade (which is
arguable), the WTO cannot properly carry the burden of dealing with
the various regulatory schemes and domestic and regional overlaps.
Much less can it decide which regulatory measures are legitimate as a
matter of domestic law. In terms of enforcement and domestic
regulation, the realist view of the nation-state as the principal actor in
international law rings true for the WTO because of its reliance on the
nation-state to enforce its decisions. 144 However, the WTO cannot hide
behind international law interpretations of its Covered Agreements 145
and ignore that some domestic regulation may be legitimate even if it
does not come under the narrow aegis of GATT Article XX
exceptions. 146 On the one hand, WTO panels are understandably
skeptical of regulatory measures in the face of free trade, for regulatory
measures can masquerade as legitimate when in reality they may be
passed to sustain protectionist and parochial paradigms. In other words,
regulatory measures can be used to protect domestic markets at the
expense of outsiders. However, current interpretations by WTO panels

143.

Panel Report, Mexico-Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, $$ 4.71-.110,

WT/DS308/R (Oct. 7, 2005). Sugar industries have been regulated in many countries, including
the United States. See Hillary E. Maki, Trade Protection vs. Trade Promotion:Are Free Trade
Agreements Good for American Workers? 20 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 883, 889,
891-94 (2006). See also Catherine Richert, U.S. Sugar Growers Look to Farm Bill for
Protection, CONG. Q., Jan. 16, 2006, http://public.cq.com/docs/cqm/cqmiddayI 10-000002656147

.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2009) (describing that in light of NAFTA requirements to open trade
barriers regarding sugar trade between Mexico and the U.S. by 2008, U.S. sugar growers have
proposed a bill to reinstate sugar quotas on Mexican sugar imports).
144. See, e.g., HANS J. MORGENTHAU & KENNETH W. THOMPSON, POLITICS AMONG
NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER & PEACE (6th ed. 1985); KENNETH WALTZ, THEORY OF
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1979); Robert 0. Keohane, Theory of World Politics: Structural
Realism and Beyond, in NEOREALISM AND ITS CRITICS 158, 158-201 (Robert 0. Keohane ed.,

1986). For an overview of the development of international relations theory from realism to neoliberalism, see generally OONA A. HATHAWAY & HAROLD HONGJU KOH, FOUNDATIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS (2005); PAUL R. VIOTTI & MARK V. KAUPPI,
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY: REALISM, PLURALISM, GLOBALISM, AND BEYOND (Allyn
& Bacon 3d ed. 1999).
145. International law rules of interpretation as found principally under Article 31 of the
Vienna Convention. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31, May 23, 1969, 8 I.L.M
679 (1969).
146. See GATT, supra note 7, art. XX. See also Hudec, GA7T/WTO Constraints,supra note
127, at 620, 626-29.
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of national treatment standards under GATT fail to consider that
virtually any domestic regulatory measure is protectionist to some
degree. Furthermore, WTO panels discount the rippling effects of their
147
decisions on regional adjudication and domestic legislative policy.
Whether it is the WTO's role to look into the legitimacy of domestic
regulatory measures as a matter of substantive law is an important
148
question, but is beyond the scope of this discussion.
With the proliferation of regional and bilateral trade agreements,
other overlaps between trade and investment rights of action (public and
private) are bound to occur. Since 2004 alone, according to the Office
of the United States Trade Representative, the U.S. has completed and
implemented ten free trade agreements with various countries such as
Chile, Singapore, Australia, the Dominican Republic, and the Central
American countries through the Central American Free Trade
Agreement (CAFTA). 14 9 The first investor-state dispute was filed by

the United States Railroad Development Corporation (RDC) in 2007
against Guatemala, claiming violations of national treatment, minimum
standards of treatment, and expropriation under CAFTA. 150 Other
claims are emerging as well. For example, the U.S. company Pacific
Rim Cayman LLC, recently filed a complaint against the government of
El Salvador under CAFTA for its failure to issue exploration and
exploitation permits to which the company claims to be entitled. Pacific
Rim claims losses to its investment as a result of the government's
action. 15 1 In this scenario, vertical/horizontal overlaps become

147.
148.

See Barron & Frug, InternationalLocal Government Law, supra note 54, at 21, 38.
Early GAT7 cases such as Malt-Beverages attempted to delve into issues of substantive

legitimacy through the aims and effects test; however, this has been rejected by later GATT and
WTO panels. See U.S.-Malt Beverages, supra note 103.
149. See Office of the United States Trade Representative, Bilateral Trade Agreements,
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade-Agreements/Bilateral/Section-Index.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2008).
150. See Inside US Trade, State Case Under CAFTA Against Guatemala, GLOBAL ExCH.,

Mar. 23, 2007, http://www.globalexchange.org/countries/americas/guatemala/4566.html.

See

also Press Release, R.R. Dev. Corp., RDC Files Claim to Institute Binding International

Arbitration Under CAFTA Against the Republic of Guatemala (June 15, 2007), available at
http://www.rrdc.com/newsrdc_CAFTA_claim_06_15_2007.pdf.
Another investor-state
arbitration has recently been initiated by a U.S. energy company, TCW Group, Inc., against the
Dominican Republic. See On Behalf of its Investing Clients, TCW Announces Expropriationand
Other Treaty Claims Against the Dominican Republic, BUS. WIRE, Mar. 20, 2007, available at

http://www.allbusiness.con/services/business-services/4336488-I.html. Many thanks to David
Gantz for his assistance in this respect.
151. See Press Release, Pacific Rim Mining Corp., Pacific Rim Files Notice of Intent to Seek
CAFTA Arbitration (Dec. 9, 2008), available at http://www.pacrim-mining.com/s/News_2008
.asp?ReportlD=331320&_Type=2008-News-Releases&_Title=Pacific-Rim-Files-Notice-of-

Intent-to-Seek-CAFTA-Arbitration
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extremely relevant and they challenge WTO panels to consider them in
their adjudication.
A. The Regulatory Approach
The regulatory approach to viewing the WTO provides a framework
for the international trade regime in which the WTO becomes the
central focus. 152 In this landscape, the WTO regulates international
trade through GATT and its Covered Agreements. The committees and
working groups study the current impact of trade on countries and, as a
result, draft amendments to, and new interpretations of the Covered
Agreements.
These may lead to increased harmonization of
15 3
standards.
international
The WTO manages the behavior of nation-states through its dispute
settlement bodies. Through their decisions, the WTO panels and
Appellate Body implement the rules as set out by GATT and its
Covered Agreements. The effect of these decisions is to grant this
international institution some legitimacy within the international trade
community. Regional tribunals such as NAFIA contribute to this
image of legitimacy by looking to WTO awards for interpretations of
provisions under regional agreements that also appear in GATT, such as
national treatment. In time, the WTO has gained a stronger hold on the
international community as having the final say on matters of
154
international trade.
However, recent challenges to the Doha Round may jeopardize this
centralized focus on the WTO as the guarantor of international trade and
155
the force behind harmonization of international trade standards.
Despite these challenges, the dispute settlement bodies remain active
and their judicial impact at the regional level cannot be denied. To view
the WTO as a supra-national institution loses sight of its many layers.
Even though its judicial awards have a "top-down" effect on the
regional tribunals as well as state politics, they can only be enforced by
nation-states. Furthermore, nation-states initiate causes of action before
WTO panels and many players influence the nation-states in doing so.

152. See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF GATT & THE WTO: INSIGHTS ON
TREATY LAW AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS 133-34 (2000). See also McGinnis & Movsesian,
supra note 25, at 549-71.
153. See AMAN, supra note 16, at 51-54 (discussing the "statecentric approach" to the WTO
and explaining that this vision of the WTO may conflict directly with domestic law).
154. See id. at 54 (discussing the "democracy deficit" that the WTO in this role may produce
on domestic administrative processes).
155. See Pruzin, supra note 58.
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A closer look into who these players are helps to unveil the many layers
56

to the international trade regime.1

B. Transnationalismand its Players
A transnational view to international trade, while not entirely
eliminating the relevance of the nation-state, does envision a world in
which a centralized international authority is replaced by the formation
of regimes. These regimes engender sets of rules and norms around
which private and state actors may coalesce to find common ground on
issues dealing with globalization. 15 7 To view trade agreements as solely
state-driven instruments misses the transnational landscape of entities
58
that drive free trade in the first place. 1
In the context of the sugar dispute between Mexico and the United
States, for example, some of the major interested players include U.S.
sugar and corn industries. 159 These same entities have also lobbied for
free trade under NAFTA when it meant that they might find a new
market in Mexico for U.S. sugar and corn. These industries compete
with one another domestically in the sweetener business because of the
long-time subsidies to the sugar and corn markets by the U.S.
government. 160 The United States Corn Refiners Association has a
major niche in the production of high fructose corn syrup which uses
yellow corn (produced in the U.S.) as its main base component.' 6 1 The

156. See Sol Picciotto, Introduction: Reconceptualizing Regulation in the Era of
Globalization, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN REGULATORY THEORY 1, 1-11 (Sol Picciotto & David
Campbell eds., 2002).
157. See, e.g., S.G. Sreejith, Public InternationalLaw and the WTO: A Reckoning of Legal
Positivism andNeoliberalism, 9 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 5, 46-73 (2007). See generally KEOHANE
& NYE, supra note 13; Keohane & Nye supra note 13, at 39-62.
158. See, e.g., James N. Rosenau, TURBULENCE IN WORLD POLITICS: A THEORY OF CHANGE
AND CONTINUITY (1990).
159. See generally Corn Refiners Association, http://www.com.org (last visited Feb. 16,
2009). Corn Refiners Association is the national trade association based in Washington, D.C. that
represents the U.S. corn refining industry. Id. See generally American Sugar Alliance,
http://www.sugaralliance.org (last visited Feb. 16, 2009). The American Sugar Alliance
represents sugarcane and sugarbeet farmers, processors, refiners, suppliers, workers, and others
associated with the U.S. sugar industry. Id.
160. See Rossella Brevetti & Michael 0. Boyle, Grassley, U.S. Industry Welcome Agreement
with Mexico on Sugar, HFCS, BNA INT'L TRADE REP., Aug. 3, 2006, at 1168. But see Rossella
Brevetti, Sugar Policy Alliance Urges Rejection of Industry NAFTA Proposal in Farm Bill, BNA
INT'L TRADE REP., Jan. 24, 2008, at 129.
161. Member companies from the major corn producing states include the following: Archer
Daniels Midland Company; Cargill, Inc.; Corn Products International, Inc.; National Starch,
L.L.C.; Penford Products Co.; Roquette America, Inc.; Tate & Lyle Ingredients Americas, Inc.
See Corn Refiners Association, Member Companies, http://www.corn.org/membercompanies
.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2009).
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friction between these two U.S. special interest groups carries over into
Mexico which also subsidizes the production of sugar. However, the
Mexican high fructose corn syrup industry is dominated by the U.S.
62
players. 1
One of the most important players, for example, is Archer Daniels
Midland Company (ADM), a leader in the processing of corn, soybeans,
wheat, and cocoa. Ethanol and high fructose corn syrup are some of its
primary products. 163 It has, for example, established in 1993 a joint
venture in Mexico with A.E. Staley Manufacturing Company (Staley)
called Almidones Mexicanos, S.A. de C.V. (ALMEX). 164 ALMEX has
storage facilities and transports and distributes the high fructose corn
syrup produced in the United States by ADM and Staley. In 2003,
ADM and Staley filed a Chapter 11 complaint against the Mexican
government for several actions allegedly directed against the two
companies, such as an antidumping action, a tax on soda bottlers using
high fructose corn syrup, and new permit requirements. 165 These and
other actions affected ADM's and Staley's combined investment of
around $55 million. 166 Along with Corn Products International, ADM
and Staley represent a large portion of the high fructose corn syrup
market both in Mexico and the United States. All three brought
NAFTA Chapter 11 investment claims against the government of
Mexico for allegedly passing measures to protect its sugar industry and
serve as non-tariff barriers against the United States.
Sugar is to Mexico what softwood lumber is to Canada. The
softwood lumber disputes are riddled with private players as well as
government actors. The softwood lumber industry has traditionally

162. The Mexican market for soft drinks is dominated by multinational corporations such as
Coca-Cola(71.9% of market) and Pepsi Cola (15.1% of market). See Panel Report, Mexico-Tax
Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, [ 2.6, WT/DS308 (Feb. 24, 2005) [hereinafter
Mexico-Tax Measures], available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade-Agreements/MonitoringEnforcement/DisputeSettlement/WTO/DisputeSettlementListi ngs/assetuploadfile273_6449
.pdf. See also Trujillo, supra note 10, at 250-51 (describing U.S. influence in Mexico in the soda
production market).
163. See Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim to Arbitration Under Section B of Chapter Eleven
of the NAFTA, Archer Daniels Midland Co. & Tate & Lyle Ingredients Americas Inc. & United
Mexican States, Oct. 13, 2003, available at http://www.naftaclaims.com/disputes-mexicoadm
.htm [hereinafter ADM & Staley].
164. Staley is an indirect wholly owned U.S. subsidiary of a British corporation, Tate & Lyle
PLC. See Tate & Lyle, http://www.tlna.comffateAndLyle/default.htm (last visited Feb. 24,

2009).
165. Final Award, Archer Daniels Midland Co. & Tate & Lyle Ingredients Americas Inc. &
United Mexican States, Sept. 26, 2007, availableat http://www.naftaclaims.comldisputes-mexico
_adm.htm.
166. See ADM & Staley, supra note 163.
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been regulated by the Canadian government and its provinces. 16 7 The

large U.S. housing and construction industries produce high demands
for softwood lumber because of its use as a base building component.
States like Idaho have been gravely affected by the cheaper price of
Canadian softwood lumber. Canadian subsidization of this industry has
created tension between two extremes of the coin of trade: on the one
hand U.S. consumers benefit from the lower cost of softwood lumber;
on the other, the U.S. softwood lumber industry suffers as a result of the
68
demand for cheaper Canadian goods.1
Furthermore, the environmental concerns revolving around the
demand for softwood lumber cannot be ignored either. However, the
NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement cannot properly address these
issues. 169 For one thing, this agreement imposes an obligation on the
NAFFA governments to adhere to domestic environmental laws without
defining baseline standards that must be met, other than domestic ones
already in place. Furthermore, the Environmental Side Agreement

establishes a Commission on Environmental Cooperation (CEC)
composed of a council headed by the environmental ministers of each of
the NAFTA countries. 170 Though the council also consists of an
independent advisory committee, the council cannot escape political

capture by whatever political party is in power at any one time; this
affects its aggressiveness in addressing environmental issues. However,
the NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement has been useful in raising
awareness of the link between trade and the environment. 17 1 Citizen

167. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
168. See Katherine Yung, Toppled by Tariffs: U.S. -Canada Timber Fued Spotlights NAFTA's
Shortcoming Job Losses, Soft Prices and Bitterness Flow When Rules Don't Work, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, May 11, 2003, at ID; For more discussion on the state and non-state actors in
Canada and the United States responding to the Softwood Lumber Dispute, see Peter Kennedy,
Analyst Slams Softwood Proposal, While Abitibi Boss Leans Toward Deal; Proposal to Cap
Canada'sShare of U.S. Market at 34 Per Cent Called -- Disgusting', GLOBE AND MAIL, Apr. 27,
2006, at B3; Peter Kennedy & Barrie McKenna, Canfor Suing US Over Lumber Duties Claims
Punitive Tariffs on Canadians,GLOBE AND MAIL, Nov. 6, 2001, at BI; Brian Milner, Column,
Taking Stock: Lumber Dispute: Free Trade American Style, GLOBE AND MAIL, Apr. 3, 2001, at
B 17; Simon Tick & Peter Kennedy, Both Sides Standing Firm in Dispute on Softwood, GLOBE
AND MAIL, Aug. 2, 2003, at B 1.
169. See North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Sept.
14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480 (1993). The agreement entered into force January 1, 1994. Id.
170. See id. art. 9.
171. Richard Fisher, Trade and Environment in the FTAA: Learning from the NAFTA, in
GREENING THE AMERICAS: NAFITA'S LESSONS FOR HEMISPHERIC TRADE, 183, 187-95 (Carolyn
L. Deere & Daniel C. Esty eds., 2002). Fisher states that the NACEC has been successful in a
number of ways including the following:
[Tlhrough a combination of research, newsletters, and new tools for environmental
monitoring and data collection, the NACEC has improved understanding of trade and

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 40

participation through the citizen submission process to initiate a review
of treaty commitments also helps to gather information from the ground
up and enhances local understanding of environmental issues more
72
generally. 1
In sum, at the grass roots level, state and non-state actors are at the
center of these two NAFTA disputes. These players contribute to the
confluence of public and private interests both domestically and
internationally with regard to ways of dealing with a problem, and
internationally with respect to the trade disputes that have arisen both at
the regional and multilateral levels.
Transnationalism and legal
pluralism in this context offer a lens through which to view international
trade regimes as fluid and engendering multiple norms and lawmaking
communities. 173 They also reveal that these different communities may
collide at various levels, offering new opportunities for negotiation;
however, they may also reconstitute themselves, allowing new norms to
174
trickle down and take effect at a grass roots level.
C. Reciprocal Deference ProceduralMechanism
The challenge for WTO panels is to respect legitimate domestic
regulatory policies while still implementing international standards that
allow for predictability in their adjudication of domestic regulatory
policy. Though it is not the role of WTO panels to decide whether
domestic measures are legitimate as a matter of substantive law, they
must have some procedural basis upon which to assess issues of
legitimacy. A regulatory model would be weak in formulating these
assessments. Procedural mechanisms that place the burden on member

environment issues. . . . [It] has initiated a range of initiatives that support greater
environmental cooperation among the NAFTA countries .... [It] has made important
contributions to improving the enforcement of environmental laws by devising tools
and mechanisms to promote pollution control, investigation, and reporting as well as
public participation. . . . [Through] consistently working to seek public input and
incorporate the insights and expertise of civil society into its activities and projects, the
NACEC's initiatives have been greatly enhanced.
See id. at 187-89.
172. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993, 32 I.L.M.
1480 (1993); See also Kal Raustiala, Citizen Submissions and Treaty Review in the NAAEC, in
GREENING NAFTA; THE NORTH AMERICAN COMMISSION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION,

256 (David L. Markell & John H. Knox eds., 2003).
173. See also AMAN, supra note 16, at 85 (stating that "the more pluralist approach, in which
the WTO is not a suprafederal structure but an agency of states, obviates the questions of a single
or unified 'world demos' in favor of a plural demos for whom democracy is not just a structural
question (of state representation) but also a basis for inclusion in substantive and procedural
terms").
174. For more discussion, see infra Part IV.
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states to maintain transparent political processes and prove the need for
regulatory measures would allow for more coordination between the
WTO and member states as well as with regional tribunals.
In a procedural mechanism called reciprocal deference, the WTO
may have a stronger impact at the domestic level rather than solely as an
outside enforcer for free trade. 17 5 In a reciprocal deference approach,
member state respondents would have the burden of proving the
legitimacy of their facially neutral regulatory measures according to
their own transparent regulatory schemes. Furthermore, it would create
a space for WTO panels to unpack the vertical/horizontal overlaps that
are at play and recognize that certain regional disputes are best resolved
at the regional level.
Though similar to the antidiscrimination model proposed by
Professors McGinnis and Movsesian, 176 the reciprocal deference
approach differs in a few ways: (1) it does not rely solely on risk
assessment and science to determine procedural legitimacy; (2) it
recognizes the jurisdictional overlaps at play among regional tribunals,
domestic administrative processes, and the WTO; (3) it does not
discount a regulatory model in setting standards in specific instances
such as labor, health, the environment, and transparency issues; and (4)
it encourages dialogue between domestic administrative bodies and the
WTO forum, thereby increasing WTO's "influence" at the domestic
level without imposing normative standards per se or ignoring the
possibility for legitimate regulatory policy.
Much like the antidiscrimination model which encourages deference
to national risk assessment mechanisms to distinguish between
legitimate and non-legitimate measures, reciprocal deference also
recognizes that it is within the domestic regulatory processes that
protectionist measures may best be curtailed.
Some may ask if a strategy that encourages deference to domestic
institutions just incites institutions to pass protectionist measures under
the guise of legitimate and transparent democratic processes. While
there is concern for protectionist capture at the local level, the
regulatory model does not necessarily eliminate this at the domestic
level. Furthermore, special interest groups at the domestic level will
battle against each other, and the democratic process will ultimately
decide how best to comply with free trade commitments. 17 7 A
175. The author has coined the term "reciprocal deference," as used in this context. See
Trujillo, supra note 10, at 256-61.
176. McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 25, at 566-71.
177. See id. at 515 (discussing the positive effects on free trade that special interest groups
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regulatory model may run the risk of capture as well, particularly if it
does not encourage fluidity and change. The WTO's ability to
influence the behavior of its member states rests primarily in its ability
to authorize members to retaliate against other members not in
compliance with GATT agreements. Ultimately, however, the WTO
relies on its member states to enforce its decisions. 178 Too much
retaliatory behavior by member states leads to isolationism, which is
exactly what GATT was intended to prevent. Furthermore, the WTO
may shape public perception of a nation's willingness to remain
committed to the international regime as a whole. 179 In doing so, the
WTO may increase its legitimacy as an international adjudicatory body
for trade and be a catalyzing force around which various public and
private networks may coalesce.
Other obvious drawbacks to this procedural mechanism (and even to
the antidiscrimination model) include the effects it may have on less
developed nations. These nations may not be able to afford to gather
the information necessary to prove to the WTO panels the legitimacy of
their regulatory measures or to implement national risk assessment
mechanisms. This is a significant concern, and greater technical
assistance from the international community, including the WTO, is
necessary in this context. While being an important drawback, it also
allows for increased transparency, particularly in countries where little
administrative accountability exists.
The reciprocal deference approach is just one piece of the larger
puzzle of cohesiveness and coordination between WTO adjudicatory
power and domestic implementation of WTO policies. It is not the final
solution, but it provides a procedural safeguard for WTO adjudication
of internal regulatory measures. For example, if the panel finds that as a
matter of GATT law, the measure in question is facially neutral yet has
some protectionist effects on trade, the panel should ask the legislature
implementing the measure to prove the corresponding domestic need. It
will then be up to the WTO panel to make a final determination as to
compliance with GATT and the Covered Agreements. But, in this
context, WTO panels may have the discretion to push regional tribunals
to settle matters within their own jurisdiction (particularly if there is an
ongoing relevant public or private right of action pending), thereby

may have at the domestic level).
178. See G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: An Analysis of
the World Trade Organization, 44 DUKE L.J. 829, 901-04 (1995).
179. See id. at 895-901.
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unpacking overlaps and minimizing the influence of private rights of
action on WTO judicialization.
IV.

COORDINATION THROUGH RECIPROCAL DEFERENCE

Much like domestic governance within the United States, the
international trade scheme incorporates the multi-scalar-supranational
regimes of the WTO and the regional tribunals against the backdrop of
domestic trade legislation and regulatory policy.180 Be that as it may,
regional trade agreements are a reality and are very much alive through
their dispute settlement mechanisms. This collage of trade regimes
creates opportunity for diversity as well as conflict.
A. The PluralistLandscape of Free Trade
It could be argued that trade has emerged into a pluralist landscape,
beyond the centralized umbrella of the WTO and its agreements. Legal
pluralism can be used to explain hybridity of norms going as far back as
the western medieval period. 18 1 It recognizes that norms may be
created through various local communities without the formality of a
sovereign to back them. 18 2 Legal pluralism recognizes that even if there
is a lack of a formal and unified state to enforce them, various levels of
norms can impact individuals in their choices.
Even family
relationships and attitudes may be governed by various layers of law
that are beyond the parameters of the state. 183 Although overlapping
norms, practices, and legal systems have arguably existed throughout
western history, modem legal pluralists view these conflicts among
different bodies of law as "fundamental." 184 Legal pluralism welcomes

180. See infra Part 1A-C. See also Osofsky, Geography of Climate Change Litigation
supra note 15, at 1813-15 (describing the multiscalar nature of environmental litigation).
181. See Brian Z. Tamanaha, Understanding Legal Pluralism: Past to Present, Local to
Global, 30 SYDNEY L. REV. 375, 375-411 (2008) (providing a history of legal pluralism).
Professor Tamanaha describes at least three major axes of legal pluralism during the mid to late
medieval period: "coexisting, overlapping bodies of law with different geographical reaches;
coexisting institutionalized systems; and conflicting legal norms within a system." See id. at 378.
182. See Berman, supra note 14, at 1157 (stating that "legal pluralists have long noted that
law does not reside solely in the coercive commands of a sovereign power"). See also Paul Schiff
Berman, From InternationalLaw to Law and Globalization,43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 485,
507-11 (2005) [hereinafter Berman, Law & Globalization](discussing legal pluralism).
183. See Carol Weisbrod, The Family, in BUTTERFLY, THE BRIDE: ESSAYS ON LAW,
NARRATIVE, AND THE FAMILY 73, 82 (1999) (analyzing Kafka's Letter to His Father as
suggesting that within Kafka's family interacting legal regimes were at play that included the law
of the state, the household, religious-social, and private or "conscience").
184. See Tamanaha, supra note 181, at 389 (clarifying that legal pluralists construe the
hybridity of legal institutions and bodies of law "as fundamental, ineradicable, and important
characteristics central to the operation and functioning of these systems"). Professor Tamanaha
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the conflict that overlapping legal regimes may create because conflict
engenders dialogue and the evolution of new norms. It is in the

interface of conflict that change may occur.
It seems counterintuitive to view free trade through the lens of legal
pluralism when presumably the WTO has institutionalized trade and has
become the ultimate enforcer of its own supranational laws established
through its Covered Agreements. However, this more unitary view of
the WTO comports with a regulatory model of the WTO. The hope of
free traders is that over time, the "top-down" international law making

processes of the WTO (primarily through its dispute resolution bodies)
become accepted by member states and internalized into their domestic
regulatory processes. Furthermore, deference by regional and bilateral

tribunals to WTO adjudication of national treatment creates a "bottomup" coordination that further solidifies the legitimacy of the WTO as a

supranational law making institution.
However, the pluralist story surrounding trade regimes lies in the
increasing importance of the various regional and bilateral tribunals that
have emerged in the last ten to fifteen years.' 85 On the one hand, these

goes on to explain that "[gilobal legal pluralism, when viewed in this light, in a sense is
'produced' when one takes seriously the global or transnational legal order, while keeping an eye
on the evident and inevitable divergences and conflicts." Id. See also Berman supra note 14, at
1157-1237. For more discussion on legal pluralism, see BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS,
TOWARD A NEW LEGAL COMMON SENSE: LAW, GLOBALIZATION, AND EMANCIPATION (2d ed.
2002); LAW AND GLOBALIZATION FROM BELOW: TOWARDS A COSMOPOLITAN LEGALITY
(Boaventura de Sousa Santos & Cdsar A. Rodrfguez-Garavito eds., 2005); CAROL WEISBROD,
EMBLEMS OF PLURALISM: CULTURAL DIFFERENCES AND THE STATE (2002); Gunther Teubner,
'Global Bukowina': Legal Pluralismin the World Society, in GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE 3,
3-22 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1997); Gunther Teubner, The Two Faces of Janus: Rethinking Legal
Pluralism, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 1443, 1443-62 (1992); David M. Engel, Legal Pluralism in an
American Community: Perspectives on a Civil Trial Court, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 425,
425-54 (1980); John Griffiths, What Is Legal Pluralism?, 24 J. LEGAL PLURALISM &
UNOFFICIAL L. 1, 1-39 (1986); Sally Engle Merry, International Law and Sociolegal
Scholarship: Toward a Spatial Global Legal Pluralism, 41 STUD. IN L. POL'Y & SOC'Y 149,
149-65 (2008); Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 L. & Soc'Y REV. 869, 870 (1988); Sally
Falk Moore, Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous Social Field as an Appropriate
Subject of Study, 7 L. & SOC'Y REV. 719, 719-45 (1973); Balakrishnan Rajagopal, The Role of
Law in Counter-hegemonic Globalization and Global Legal Pluralism: Lessons from the
Narmada Valley Struggle in India, 18 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 345, 345-87 (2005); William W. BurkeWhite, International Legal Pluralism, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 963, 963-79 (2004); Brian Z.
Tamanaha, A Non-Essentialist Version of Legal Pluralism, 27 J. L. & SOC'Y 296, 296-321
(2000).
185. See, e.g., NAFTA, supra note 5; MERCOSUR, supra note 96; The Central AmericaDominican Republic-United States Free Trade Agreement, Aug. 5, 2004, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade-Agreements/Bilateral/CAFrA/CAFrA-DRFinalTexts/Section
_Index.html; The United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, U.S.-Peru, Apr. 12, 2006,
available at http://www.ustr.govlTradeAgreements/BilaterallPeruTPAIFinalTexts/Section
_Index.html.
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tribunals look to WTO interpretations of trade law in areas such as
national treatment and in this way, draw strength from the perceived
legitimacy of the WTO as a centralized institution for free trade matters.
On the other hand, these same tribunals assert some independence from
the WTO in unpacking the overlaps that exist between the multilateral
and regional regimes and refusing to transplant public trade issues into
matters of private investment. The Methanex case was an example of
this. 186 These various trade regimes are new fora for the development
and implementation of various trade norms. At times, these fora may
collide, as in the cases surrounding the softwood lumber dispute
between the United States and Canada. However, collision also
engenders dialogue, and out of the dialogical approach of the dispute
settlement process may emerge cooperation and a new set of norms.
Over time, some norms may solidify and become hard law.
Despite the positive results legal pluralism may offer in this context,
the WTO must remain the central focal point for the multilateral system
if it is to be effective in maintaining a cohesive, globalized, trading
community. The WTO must be the coordinating force that balances the
multi-tiered aspects of free trade agreements. It can do this not by
ignoring the pluralist landscape of other adjudicatory processes
affecting trade (regional, bilateral, domestic) but by recognizing the
existence of other such processes at the regional and bilateral levels.
Reciprocal deference is one procedural mechanism that WTO panels
can use to help increase this kind of recognition while "managing [the]
hybridity" that legal pluralism envisions.
B. Bottom-Up Coordination
While legal pluralism gives us insight into the forces that collide to
engender norms among communities and legal regimes, regime shifting
gives insight into the fluid, porous nature of international trade when it
is viewed as an instrument of transnationalism and not solely as the
expression of a centralized international authority. The multiplicity of
norms arising from international trade can be vast. 18 7 The judicial
activism of the WTO dispute resolution bodies also grounds the
convergence among norm-creating communities, eventually allowing
for WTO interpretations of national treatment and regulatory policy to
reconstitute themselves at the domestic level.

186. See infra Part 1V.B.
187. See Mexico-Tax Measures, supra note 162. For more discussion, see supra Part Ill.B.
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Industrialized nations benefit from regime shifting in that their rich
legal resources make forum shopping more readily available.1 88 Certain
issues that remain unclear or are stricter under regional agreements,
such as NAFTA, can be resolved under the WTO and perhaps result in
more favorable decisions. One clear example of this was the WTO
case, Canada-CertainMeasures Concerning Periodicals,18 9 in which
the United States brought a WTO dispute against the Canadian
government for passing an eighty percent excise tax on imported splitrun periodicals. Canada first argued, unsuccessfully, that the GATS 19 0
rather than GATT applied, since the tax applied to the service of
advertising in split-run periodicals rather than to goods. Then Canada
tried to argue that split-run periodicals were unlike non split-run
periodicals, particularly since Canada had not committed to liberalizing
its cultural industry sectors. Therefore, this was a legitimately protected
sector in Canada. The Appellate Body agreed with the United States
and found Canada in violation of GATT Article 111:2.
Interestingly, the United States could easily have brought the case
under NAFTA, which begs the question why it chose not to do so.
Article 2106 and its Annex 191 contain a Canadian cultural industry

exception to trade liberalization policy, allowing the Canadian
government to protect its culture, which likely influenced the United
States to take the dispute to the WTO rather than to a NAFTA tribunal.
Clearly, regime shifting in this context served the interests of the United
States best and strengthened the utility of GATT Article III more
generally than under NAFTA. No cultural exceptions dispute has been
brought before a NAFTA tribunal to date.
However, there has been much discussion among states concerning
the role of trade on culture. This finally evolved into the creation of the
UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity
of Cultural Expressions in March 2007.192 With eighty members,
188. But see id. (demonstrating that developing states as well as NGOs can use regime
shifting as leverage in treaty negotiations).
189. Appellate Body Report, Canada-Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals,
WT/DS31/AB/R (June 30, 1997), available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/wtoab/
canada-periodicals(ab).pdf.
190. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1167 (1994),
availableat http://wwwworldtradelaw.net/uragreements/gats.pdf.
191. Article 2106 and Annex 2106 follow the cultural exception as established under the
Canadian-United States Agreement and applies it more broadly to include individuals and
enterprises. See NAFTA, supra note 5, art. 2106-07.
192. UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural
Expressions, Oct. 20, 2005 (2005) [hereinafter UNESCO Convention], available at
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/omages/0014/001429/142919e.pdf.
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including industrialized nations such as Germany and the United
Kingdom, the UNESCO Convention has shifted the discussion of
culture from international trade regimes to the realm of the United
Nations and has alerted the international community to the importance
of preserving culture in the context of free trade. 193 In this way, the
disappointing WTO decision for Canada has allowed for the creation of
a non-binding counter-regime norm, such as the UNESCO Convention,
through regime shifting.
While regime shifting can help to increase dialogue among nations as
in the example of cultural industries, it can also enhance the effects of
"bottom-up coordination" through intra-regime shifts. However, it
offers few answers for inter-regime shifts that paralyze the application
of shared substantive issues. For example, the tendency of Chapter 11
tribunals to defer to WTO adjudication of Article III in deciding alleged
national treatment violations seems to imply that a WTO finding of
Mexico's lack of compliance with commitments under GATT will
naturally result in a NAFTA finding that Mexico's tax also violated
Chapter 11 national treatment obligations. It is not a necessary
conclusion that a national treatment violation in the trade context will
result in a violation in the investment context. In fact, Methanex
clarifies that the two do not necessarily follow. However, the ostrichlike behavior of WTO panels to not address the regional context of a
trade problem, that is, this lack of top-down coordination by WTO
panels, leads to uncertainty and a disconnect among regional trade
regimes and the multilateral regime. 194 Regime shifting may encourage
the proliferation of soft and hard law doctrines in the context of
international law and international trade, but it offers little for
coordination among the regimes, particularly in the context shared
substantive issues such as national treatment.
C. ReciprocalDeference and Managing Hybridity
Of much concern to citizens and to the international community is the
effect that increased international trade will have on issues that are
inherently addressed locally, such as the environment, labor, economic
193. The United States is not a member of the UNESCO Convention; however, China is a
member. UNESCO, http://www.portal.unesco.org/la/convention.asp?KO=31038&language=E
&order=alpha (last visited Mar. 1, 2009). For a full list of member states as of March 2008, see
id.
194.

But see Brazil-Retreaded Tyres Panel Report, supra note 133 (discussing that the WTO

panels for the first time addressed an exemption arising under a regional agreement,
MERCOSUR, and decided whether Brazil's attempt to comply with this exemption was in fact a
violation of GATT provisions).
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development, and distribution of municipal services such as water,
waste, and energy. While the WTO panels choose not to address issues
outside the scope of trade, and perhaps rightly so, there is a growing
concern among NGOs and others that the long-lasting effects of trade
and investment liberalization will be difficult for local governments to
manage.
Perhaps this is the point of free trade: to ensure that
destructive parochial attitudes do not hinder the positive effects that free
flow of goods, services, and capital have on local communities. While
this Article does not attempt to determine whether increased trade is
good or bad for local communities, it hopes to illustrate that free trade
and its institutions also impact the relationship among international and
domestic paradigms of governance. Trade and investment liberalization
together encourage the blurring of lines between the public and private
domains and put into question the role of government vis d vis the WTO
and regional trade agreements.
In discussing legal pluralism, Paul Berman has stated that "[s]tudies
of the international legal order ... must address the interplay of a wide
variety of normative commitments and law-giving entities." 19 5 The
procedural nature of reciprocal deference allows the WTO panels to
manage trade without avoiding the hard questions of legitimate
regulatory policy and domestic governance. It does not ask the WTO
panels to address issues of legislative intent behind domestic measures;
however, it allows the WTO panels to place the burden back onto the
responding states to prove the legitimacy of their regulatory measures.
Reciprocal deference emulates NAFFA Chapter Il 's two-step
adjudicatory process in dealing with domestic regulation. Even if there
is a finding of "like products" and "less favourable treatment," 19 6 the
WTO panel can delve into the regulatory context of the measure by
placing the burden on the responding state to prove that no other
alternative means exists other than this measure.
Furthermore,
reciprocal deference allows a WTO panel to unpack the vertical and
horizontal overlaps between the regimes at play and their inter-systemic
substantive overlaps and better address the issue at hand. While the
WTO panel cannot per se adjudicate a "NAFTA issue," nothing
prevents a WTO panel from "remanding" a case back to the regional
tribunal after it has decided the issue under its own jurisdiction. In this
way, increased dialogue may occur among the regimes and among
WTO member states on issues of regulatory policy and regional
integration.
This "top-down coordination" effect of reciprocal
195. See Berman, Law & Globalization,supra note 182, at 511.
196. NAFrA, supra note 5, art. 11:2, 111:4.
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deference will not eliminate "bottom-up coordination" or the shifting
that occurs among the pluralist landscape of regimes; however, it will
help the WTO better "manage hybridity" 197 and help enhance
coordination and transparency among the regimes and within local
governance.
CONCLUSION

Robert Hudec described the WTO on the one hand as a "freestanding
institution" and on the other "as an ingredient of the domestic
decisionmaking process of national govemments."' 19 8 In this role, the
WTO has the challenging risk of enforcing the economic goals of the
global community while also preserving non-economic objectives of the
WTO, including development, peace, transparency, and just distribution
of economic assets through economic interdependence and
multilateralism. Even if viewed as a regulatory model, the WTO as a
central regulatory commission for trade cannot properly carry the
burden of dealing with the various regulatory schemes and domestic and
international overlaps. Much less can it decide which regulatory
measures are legitimate as a matter of substantive domestic law.
However, it cannot ignore them either, for regulatory measures can
masquerade as legitimate when in reality they may be passed to sustain
protectionist and parochial paradigms.
Enforcement of WTO decisions may only occur at the domestic level.
While incorporating the standards set by the WTO, most sovereign
member states already have administrative processes to manage trade
issues and many have entered into their own regional and bilateral trade
agreements, as authorized under Article XXIV of GATF. Member
states and private entities do, however, look to the WTO both for
political support to criticize restrictive trade measures of their
counterparts and for affirmative rulings on those policies. In this way,
the WTO is as much an internal player in domestic trade and regulatory
policy-making as it is an external adjudicator.
Whereas regional tribunals seem to be defining the jurisdictional
scope of their adjudicatory processes, both in relation to other regional
adjudicatory processes and vis a vis the multilateral processes, WTO
panels for the most part ignore the question all together. Although,
arguably Brazil-Retreaded Tyres indicates an initial shift by WTO
197. See Berman, supra note 14, at 1196-1234.
198. Robert E. Hudec, Comment by Robert E. Hudec, in EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, AND
LEGITIMACY: THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM AT THE MILLENNIUM 297 (Roger B. Porter
et al. eds., 2001).
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Cases such as Corn Products International,

Softwood Lumber, and Methanex illuminate the vertical and horizontal
overlaps that exist among multilateral resolutions of trade matters and
regional resolutions of foreign investments matters.
Unpacking the vertical/horizontal overlaps among trade regimes is
important for WTO dispute settlement bodies so that it may remain a
"neutral" international institution that manages and adjudicates trade
matters.
With the proliferation of regional and bilateral trade
agreements, other overlaps of trade and investment regimes of action
(public and private) are bound to occur. 199 The challenge for WTO
panels is to respect legitimate domestic regulatory policies while still
implementing international standards that allow for predictability in
their adjudication of domestic regulatory policy. Though it is not the
role of WTO panels to decide whether domestic measures are legitimate
as a matter of substantive law, they must have some procedural basis
upon which to assess issues of legitimacy. A regulatory model would
be weak in formulating these assessments. Procedural mechanisms that
place the burden on member states to maintain transparent political
processes and prove the need for regulatory measures would allow for
more coordination 0between
the WTO and member states as well as with
20
regional tribunals.
Through procedural mechanisms, such as reciprocal deference, WTO
panels can unpack these overlaps and push regional tribunals on matters
that are more appropriately managed at the regional level. In an
interview in Fortune Magazine, the famous architect Santiago Calatrava
described a bridge as "a symbolic gesture, linked with the needs of
people who cross over it, and with the idea of overcoming or
surmounting obstacles." 20 1 Bridges are also "work[s] of art" that help
to "shape our daily lives." 20 2 This simple analogy is very telling for
those who see the international community as one that is pluralist in
nature, consisting of state and non-state actors forming networks to
bring about change. The WTO is an institution around which all these
players may coalesce and renegotiate international trade norms.

199. See Joel P. Trachtman, International Trade: Regionalism, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK IN
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 151, 151-76 (Andrew T. Guzmdn & Alan 0. Sykes eds., 2007)
(discussing regionalism as an "accelerating phenomenon" and as creating "international economic
law subsystems").
200. International efforts should be made in the context to assist lesser developed economies
in meeting this burden of proof and maintaining transparency.
201. Julie Schlosser, Calatrava'sLightness of Being, FORTUNE MAG., Nov. 13, 2006, at 127,
132.
202. Id. at 131-32.
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However, a recent push for regionalism and the challenges of the Doha
Round raise doubt as to the strength of the multilateral trade regime.
Creating bridges that may bind these networks is important. Procedural
mechanisms, such as reciprocal deference, allow for increased
coordination, enhanced transparency, and accountability at the domestic
level. They can help to build sustainable bridges among the various
trade regimes, allowing an international network that can influence
domestic governance without eliminating its relevance.
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Illustration1
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Illustration2

Horizontal Public/Private Overlap

Trade issues at the
regional level...
...
evolve into
private investment
disputes

Softwood Lumber
HFCS/Sugar
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Illustration4

Substantive Law Overlap
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Illustration5

"Methanex Effect"
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